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Article 
Snoozing Democracy: 





“[There is] no cure for law but more law.” 
-Karl Llewellyn1 
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 1. In the context of teaching first-year law students, Karl Llewellyn wrote: 
Details, unnumbered, shifting, sharp, disordered, unchartable, jagged. 
And all of this that goes on in class but an excuse to start you on a 
wilderness of other matters you need. The thicket presses in, the great 
hooked spikes rip clothes and hide and eyes. High sun, no path, no 
light, thirst and the thorns. —I fear there is no cure. No cure for law 
but more law. No vision save at the cost of plunging deeper. 
 
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930), 
reprinted in CHRIS GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A 
JOURNALIST AT YALE LAW SCHOOL 9, 9 (2002). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 At times of crisis, fewer rules are often regarded as more.2 
Fewer rules may mean more expeditious decisions,3 more 
effective reactions to threats to national security,4 financial 
support for economic sectors in need,5 and less bureaucracy. At 
 
 2. Philip Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 838 (2004) 
(discussing Mies van der Rohe’s adoption of the phrase as a slogan for 
modernism in architecture that reputedly provoked Frank Lloyd Wright to 
respond that “less is only more where more is no good”); id. (citing JOHN SMITH, 
THE MYSTERIE OF RHETORIQUE UNVAIL’D 56 (1657) and Robert Browning, 
Andrea Del Sarto, in MEN AND WOMEN for the arguments that the phrase “less 
is more” may have derived from attempts to define the trope known as 
“meiosis.”). For an analysis in the specific context of crisis, see OREN GROSS & 
FIONNUALA NI AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (2006) (“[W]hen a nation is faced with emergencies 
its legal, and even constitutional, structure must be somewhat relaxed . . . .”). 
 3. In a number of countries, administrative decision-making procedures 
are relaxed at times of economic crisis in order to avoid regulatory delay. For 
example, this was the position taken in the Netherlands with the Crisis en 
Herstelwet (Crisis and Recovery Act) that aimed to foster sustainable 
development and innovation in the construction and energy sectors after the 
global financial crisis in 2008. Legislators realized that long waiting periods 
imposed by the existing administrative system delayed the acquisition of 
required licenses and permits. This Act authorized the enactment of 
experimental regulations that derogated from existing rules in order to 
facilitate the operationalization of construction projects. This was the case of 
the expansion of the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. The Act entered into effect 
in March 2010 originally in a ‘record’ period of seven months, and was converted 
into a permanent statute in March 2013. See Nico Verhey, The Fast and the 
Furious: De Crisis en Herstelwet, 27 REGELMAAT 140 (2012) (describing the 
drafting process of the Crisis and Recovery Statute); Jan Roording, Versnelling 
van Wetgeving: over Uiteenlopende Ontwikkelingen en Eigenwijze Actoren, 27 
REGELMAAT 126, 127 (2012) (examining the accelerated process of the 
legislation and the difficulties in gathering political consensus for enacting the 
Crisis and Recovery Act). 
 4. See President George W. Bush, Address on the Patriot Act & the 
National Security Agency (Dec. 17, 2005) (transcript available in Martin 
Medhurst & Paul Stob, George W. Bush on the Patriot Act and the National 
Security Agency, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC, http://www.presidentialrhetoric.
com/speeches/12.17.05.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (“The Patriot Act tore 
down the legal and bureaucratic wall that kept law enforcement and 
intelligence authorities from sharing vital information about terrorist threats. 
And the Patriot Act allowed federal investigators to pursue terrorists with tools 
they already used against other criminals. Congress passed this law with a 
large, bipartisan majority, including a vote of 98-1 in the United States 
Senate.”). 
 5. Financial intervention at times of crisis must, however, be limited in 
time—this has not always been clear. In 2014, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) analyzed the Netherlands’ intervention 
in the housing market and suggested the introduction of sunset clauses in 
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times of crisis we observe a phenomenon called temporary de-
juridification, which is the strategic disappearance or 
suspension of law.6 Temporary de-juridification in the context of 
emergencies can mean that special and extraordinary measures 
are enacted to respond to a certain crises, in derogation of 
existing standards and rules. Certain rules—thought to be more 
burdensome and incompatible with wartime or economic 
crises—thus “disappear,” being replaced, for example, by 
simplified procedures or exceptional rules. To illustrate, in the 
European context, state aid to national firms is not generally 
allowed since it can impair the functioning of the European 
single market.7 However, during the 2008–09 economic crisis, 
 
measures designed to support financial institutions and the housing market in 
order to limit risks. See Heleen M.J. Hofmans & Clement P. Van de Coevering, 
How to Deal with Contingent Liabilities—Lessons from the Dutch Experience, 1 
OECD J. BUDGETING 35, 37–43 (2014) (“In response to the financial crisis, the 
Dutch government has provided substantial support to financial institutions, 
sovereigns and the housing market.”). In the United States, the efforts to 
overcome the crisis were visible in the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, which aimed to promote 
employment and assist a number of economic sectors by including measures to 
increase unemployment benefits, stimulate investments in the energy industry, 
healthcare, and construction, and improve new facilities. 
 6. The term de-juridification has often been used in different fields of law 
to refer to the strategic disappearance of law, often with negative repercussions 
for the rights of individual subjects. By adding the adjective “temporary,” we 
refer more specifically to the disappearance of law circumscribed to a certain 
period of time. This normally occurs in the context of crises when rules are 
considered as hurdles to effective decision-making and executive action. 
Temporary de-juridification has, however, remained highly overlooked in the 
context of emergencies. We find more references to de-juridification, for 
example, in the field of labor law, to refer to the exemption of labor law 
standards, such as decent work standards. See Siobhan Mullally, Introduction: 
Decent Work, Domestic Work: Gendered Borders and Immigration, in CARE, 
MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 10 (Siobhan Mullally 
ed., 2015). See also Marcelo Neves, Between Under-Integration and Over-
Integration: Not Taking Citizenship Seriously, in IMAGINING BRAZIL 61, 69–70 
(Jesse Souza & Valter Sinder eds., 2007) (discussing de-juridification processes 
that enact exemptions and limitations to work standards impacting 
integration). De-juridification has also been employed in family law. See ALISON 
DIDUCK, LAW’S FAMILIES 183–84 (2003) (“[A]nother goal of this legislation may 
have been to relieve expenditure and costs related to the litigation of child 
support disputes . . . . [B]ut unlike other de-juridification measures which 
provided incentives to encourage families to order their own affairs . . . , this 
was a shift towards interventionism.”) (emphasis added). 
 7. State aid is regulated by a number of treaty provisions and regulations. 
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 107–09, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 1 [hereinafter TFEU]; 
Council Regulation 659/1999 of Mar. 22, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 83) 1–9 (prescribing 
detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the TFEU); Communication 
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the European Commission allowed for more flexibility at this 
level, authorizing the adoption of temporary measures to ensure 
that European companies would continue investing in research 
and development in spite of financial strain.8 
Another form of temporary de-juridification occurs through 
the temporary suspension of legal dispositions regarding the 
exercise of individual rights. For example, this is the case with 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which has been at stake 
in times of crisis for centuries (see Part III infra). This form of 
de-juridification has more recently regained a place in the legal 
literature in case of suspicion of future involvement in acts of 
terrorism.9 
Temporary de-juridification also means the executive may 
be allowed to derogate from a number of constitutional 
principles, and even use armed forces to quash insurrections 
during a state of emergency.10 Past states of emergencies, the 
most notable occurring in Weimar Germany, have shown that at 
times of crisis, the executive may be allowed to act as necessary, 
 
from the Commission on the Application, from 1 January 2012, of State Aid 
Rules to Support Measures in Favour of Banks in the Context of the Financial 
Crisis, 2011 O.J. (C 356) 7. 
 8. Although there was already a simplified notice from the Commission 
for state aid measures, these rules were not applicable to the measures adopted 
in the context of the financial crisis, namely, the Temporary Union Framework 
for State Aid Measures. See Communication from the European Commission on 
the Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial 
Institutions in the Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis, 2008 O.J. (C 
270) 8; Communication from the European Commission on Temporary 
Community Framework for State Aid Measures to Support Access to Finance in 
the Current Financial and Economic Crisis, 2009 O.J. (C 16) 1; Communication 
from the Commission on a European Economic Recovery Plan, COM (2008) 800 
final (Nov. 26, 2008). Specific and temporary ad hoc arrangements have been 
put in place in order to deal with these cases in a timely manner. By introducing 
a common temporary framework, the Commission allows temporary and 
exceptionally well-targeted state aid, unblock lending to companies and 
stimulate investment in research and development. The adoption of these 
temporary measures evidences a more flexible approach to state aid rules or 
even a derogation of the existing framework. 
 9. See Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE 
L.J. 600 (2009) (analyzing suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and exploring 
the relationship between suspension, executive power, and individual rights in 
American history). 
 10. See Jackie Gardina, Toward Military Rule? A Critique of Executive 
Discretion to Use the Military in Domestic Emergencies, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1027, 
1029 (2008) (“[T]he question posed is not whether to use armed force in certain 
situations but what limitations there should be on that use . . . . [the] federal 
government may need to resort to armed force to quash insurrections or execute 
federal laws.”). 
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even if this implies circumventing statutes, treaties, and the 
constitution.11 Although we acknowledge the existence of 
emergency powers, we often forget to discuss its real meaning 
and limits. Does the need to make decisions in a timely manner 
always justify the disappearance of law? Do we know what 
temporary de-juridification means for the relationship between 
the different political branches? Furthermore, is ‘less,’ in the 
sense of fewer rules and legal limits, always ‘more?’ This Article 
aims to contribute to the understanding of the concept of 
‘temporary de-juridification’—as well as its virtues and vices. 
The word “de-juridification” might convey a fresh and fairly 
unknown legal vision for states of emergency and other crises. 
However, the temporary suspension of laws is nevertheless far 
from being a recent practice.12 Instead, it has been concretized 
for centuries through so-called sunset clauses.13 Sunset clauses 
are legislative dispositions that provide that a specific piece of 
legislation shall expire automatically on a specific date.14 Sunset 
law has been defined as a “statute under which a governmental 
agency or program automatically terminates at the end of a fixed 
 
 11. See Peter M. Shane, Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: 
The Challenges for Conscientious Legal Analysis, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 507, 508 (2012) (“Our Constitution was founded on the hope that 
government can be structured to limit the ambitions of public officials who are 
tempted to abuse their power. What we find, instead, is a willingness to 
abandon the system of checks and balances to facilitate prompt action, often at 
the cost of individual liberties and constitutional violations. There are many 
ways to summarize this trend. I call it ‘presidentialism,’ the assertion that what 
we need in times of crisis (real or contrived) is a President free to act as 
necessary, even if in violation of statutes, treaties, and the Constitution.”). 
 12. See Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension 
Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2012) (remarking that recent debates on the 
implementation of the suspension clause during wartime have not taken into 
account historical evidence and demonstrating that the temporary suspension 
of laws is far from being a recent problem by referring to the English tradition, 
the Founding period, the imprisonment of Japanese fighters, and more recently, 
to the detention of American citizens in the wake of the terrorists attacks of 
September 11, 2001). 
 13. See Mark D. Young, A Test of Federal Sunset: Congressional 
Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 27 EMORY L.J. 
853, 854 (1978) (“‘Sunset’ is the popular term for a statutory method of forcing 
a legislature to make a periodic determination whether to allow a particular 
program or agency to continue.”). See also John E. Finn, Sunset Clauses and 
Democratic Deliberation: Assessing the Significance of Sunset Provisions in 
Antiterrorism Legislation, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 442 (2010). 
 14. For a thorough analysis of sunset clauses, including a historical 
overview of this instrument, see SOFIA RANCHORDÁS, CONSTITUTIONAL 
SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION (2014). 
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period unless it is formally renewed.”15 The idea underlying the 
use of these dispositions is to terminate a number of dispositions 
when they are no longer necessary.16 
When adequately framed, sunset clauses should further the 
principle of separation of powers—even in times of crisis—
limiting the extraordinary powers of the executive to a short 
period and imposing rigorous legislative oversight.17 By 
conferring a temporary character to a law, sunset clauses 
manage legislative inertia since the continued validity of a law 
will be contingent upon a new legislative decision.18 These 
dispositions limit the duration of extraordinary powers and 
guarantee a more frequent dialogue between the executive and 
parliament.19 Sunset clauses were therefore originally employed 
to improve political accountability and transparency, by 
ensuring that unnecessary regulations and agencies would be 
terminated.20 
While ideally the ‘sun’ should not set on legislation before 
an evaluation takes place, sunset clauses seem to have acquired 
somewhat of a bad reputation. The literature has pointed out 
that the practice of states with sunset clauses seems to reveal 
that these temporary legislative measures have often been 
 
 15. Sunset Law, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 16. Sunset clauses were widely used in the twentieth century in the United 
States as instruments to combat legislative inertia, the growing power of the 
executive, and the existence of unnecessary laws, programs, and agencies. See 
Mark B. Blickle, The National Sunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 209, 
210–12 (1985) (explaining that sunset provisions emerged as a reaction to the 
general discontent with the uncontrolled governmental growth, excessive 
bureaucracy, and public spending). For a more recent analysis of the use of 
sunset clauses, see Symposium, Showcase Panel IV: A Federal Sunset Law, 16 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 339, 342 (2012). 
 17. See Richard C. Kearney, Sunset: A Survey and Analysis of the State 
Experience, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 49, 55 (1990). 
 18. See John Ip, Sunset Clauses and Counterterrorism Legislation, PUB. L. 
74, 75 (2013) (analyzing the enactment of sunset clauses in the context of the 
terrorist threats and the underlying rationale of this legislative instrument). 
 19. See Dan R. Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 401 (1978) (discussing the first examples of sunset clauses in Colorado and 
subsequent enactments in other states). See also KATHERINE R. WILLIAMSON, 
REVISITING AND EVALUATING THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (2009). This 
rationale for using sunset clauses has also been argued in Germany. See JAN 
FUNKE, BU ROKRATIEABBAUE MIT HILFE ZEITLICH BEFRISTETER GESETZE 43 
(2011) [Reduction of Bureaucracy with the Help of Temporary Legislation: The 
Effects of Sunset Legislation]. 
 20. See Lewis A. Davis, Review Procedures and Public Accountability in 
Sunset Legislation: An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 393 
(1981). 
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reauthorized without a meaningful evaluation21 or have served 
primarily to ‘sweeten’ legislative opponents to vote in favor of a 
controversial law.22 In addition, since sunset clauses are often 
renewed without being adequately revisited, temporary de-
juridification has become ‘democracy’s snooze button,’ and 
instead of reacting to the obsolescence of legislation, the 
adoption of sunset clauses simply postpones decisions regarding 
extraordinary powers.23 Therefore, sunset clauses might not 
always be a shield against the normalization of extraordinary 
emergency provisions.24 Consequently, does this mean that 
sunset clauses are a dangerous legislative instrument that 
should be banned altogether since they may be misused? 
Our answer to this question is clearly no—despite the 
potential downsides of sunset clauses, the problem here is not to 
include or leave out the temporary character of de-juridification 
during wartime or peace. Rather, the main objectives of this 
 
 21. See Christian van Stolk & Mihaly Fazekas, How Evaluation Is 
Accommodated in Emergency Policy Making, in EVALUATION AND TURBULENT 
TIMES: REFLECTIONS ON A DISCIPLINE IN DISARRAY 161, 169, 173 (Jan-Eric 
Furubo et al. eds., 2013) (“[T]he first hypothesis relating to a decrease of the 
quantity and quality of evaluation used in emergency policy making is clearly 
supported by evidence . . . . [T]he relative absence of evaluation in the 
formulation of emergency legislation is not that surprising.”). 
 22. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1041 (2011) (providing a critical overview of the use of sunset clauses in the case 
of tax cuts). For more information regarding sunset clauses focusing on the field 
of tax law, see Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of 
Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 339 (2006) (criticizing 
dispositions for being apparatuses that “underestimate the revenue costs of 
legislation or fit legislation within predetermined budget constraints”). Kysar 
additionally argues that by enacting sunset clauses, lawmakers try to reduce 
the estimation of the revenue costs of these laws and thus gather sufficient 
political consensus, since the calculation would only take the sunset period into 
account. However, in practice, the original plan was never to sunset these tax 
cuts but to renew them later. See id. Moreover, Kysar adds that sunset clauses 
have been used to circumvent budgetary constraints and enact laws meant to 
last under the “cover” of a temporary provision. 
 23. See David A. Fahrenthold, In Congress, Sunset Clauses are Commonly 
Passed but Rarely Followed Through, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-congress-sunset-clauses-are-
commonly-passed-but-rarely-followed-through/2012/12/15/9d8e3ee0-43b5-
11e2-8e70-e1993528222d_story.html (“Outdated laws were piling up. Bad ones 
weren’t being fixed. So lawmakers turned to ‘sunset clauses’—expiration dates 
forcing Congress to reconsider old laws before they disappeared. Instead, 
Washington’s current crisis reveals that the sunset clause has become 
something unintended: democracy’s snooze button.”). 
 24. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises 
Always Be Constitutional, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1090 (2003) (discussing the 
dangers of the normalization of emergency legislation). 
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Article are first to demonstrate that the tendency to de-juridify 
as a response to changes in circumstances might be necessary, 
but is not always a positive development. Second, this Article 
points out that temporary de-juridification is far from being a 
recent or national problem or trend, and instead started in 
traditional common law, and is now expanding to numerous civil 
law countries. Third, this Article argues that temporary de-
juridification is at times necessary to confer flexibility to the 
legal order, but such de-juridification must be conditioned upon 
the protection of fundamental rights and the separation of 
powers. Fourth, this Article innovates in relation to existing 
literature by suggesting a normative framework for temporary 
de-juridification. 
This Article is part of a broader literature that surged after 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when the use of sunset 
clauses to tackle the phenomenon of international terrorism took 
place on a record scale, from the United States and Canada,25 to 
the United Kingdom, Germany,26 and Australia.27 The aim of 
 
 25. For literature regarding Canada, see Tobi Cohen, Controversial Anti-
Terror Bill Passes, Allowing Preventative Arrests, Secret Hearings, NAT’L POST 
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/04/25/controversial-anti-
terror-bill-passes-allowing-preventative-arrests-secret-hearings/ (referring to 
Bill S-7, which passed in the wake of the Boston terrorist attacks and introduced 
stricter anti-terrorism rules). Cohen discusses rules introduced in Canada 
which included preventative arrest provisions which would allow an individual 
suspected of engaging in terrorist activity to be preventively imprisoned, be 
secretly arraigned, or be prevented from departing Canada to engage in 
terrorist activities. Id. (“The original legislation had a sunset clause of 2007 so 
the measures could be reviewed and, if deemed necessary, reintroduced by 
Parliament. The Conservatives have since tried to resurrect the bill four times, 
but each time it died after an election was called.”).  
      26.   In Germany, this was the case of the Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz 
[Anti-Terrorism Act], which, in 2002, introduced several temporary limitations 
to fundamental rights on the grounds of the need to safeguard national security. 
See Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Internationalen Terrorismus [Act for 
Combatting International Terrorism] Jan. 9, 2002, BGBl I at 361, no. 3 (Ger.). 
Article 22 imposed significant limitations on fundamental rights such as data 
privacy, grant of entry visas, and identity control through January 11, 2007. 
For a comparative study of the counterterrorism responses of different countries 
including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Canada, see THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF COUNTERTERRORISM (Martha Crenshaw ed., 2010). In the 
wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France, and the growing number of 
European Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) fighters in Syria, stricter 
legislative responses can be expected. See Daniel Tost, Germany Set to Pass ‘One 
of the Harshest’ Anti-Terror Laws in Europe, EURACTIV (Feb. 5, 2015), http://
www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/germany-set-pass-one-
harshest-anti-terror-laws-europe-311851. 
 27. For literature regarding Australia, see Nicola McGarrity et al., Sunset 
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this Article is not to evaluate the efficiency or explore the value 
of such clauses, or to argue in favor or against their use.28 
Instead, it aims to shift the focus of the critique of sunset clauses 
to the dipole between juridification and de-juridification, that is, 
between the creation and the disappearance of law in the context 
of emergencies, questioning what we can or cannot sunset and 
under what circumstances. Methodologically, the analysis is not 
attached to one single legal order, since the cardinal subject of 
this paper transcends borders and paradigms, which are located 
in a variety of legal orders, sufficing to mention here the United 
States, Germany, Australia, and the United Kingdom. 
This Article focuses on the relationship between law and 
rupture in turbulent periods, i.e., in times of crisis, 
circumstances may justify the temporary suspension of legal 
guarantees and institutions, derogation of numerous rules, and 
the allocation to the executive of an enhanced role in crisis 
management. This is visible not only in counterterrorism 
legislation but also in the context of the European financial 
crisis, where an “extended executive,” composed of a multitude 
of agencies at various levels, emerged to manage the credit 
crisis.29 Moreover, crises confer a fluid character to rigid laws 
until the critical situation comes to an end.30 When emergency 
strikes, immediate top-down decisions must be taken without 
time-consuming procedures, bureaucratic obstacles, or attempts 
to gather consensus of potential political opponents.31 As we 
mentioned earlier, this is, for example, the case of the European 
Commission’s Temporary Union Framework for State Aid 
Measures32 or the Dutch Crisis en Herstelwet. The first 
 
Clauses in Australian Anti-Terror Laws, 33 ADELAIDE L. REV. 307 (2012). 
 28. Professor Ackerman endorses the use of sunset clauses during 
emergencies. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 
1029 (2004). Other scholars, including Gross, consider sunset clauses ineffective 
tools. See Gross, supra note 24. A more recent evaluation of sunset clauses is 
recorded in literature. See, e.g., Finn, supra note 13; Ip, supra note 18. 
 29. For more information on this occurring in the United Kingdom, see 
Julia Black, The Credit Crisis and the Constitution, in THE REGULATORY STATE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 92, 112–13 (Dawn Oliver et al. eds., 2010). 
 30. See Peter van Lochem & Nico Florijn, Does Necessity Know No Law? On 
the Relative Significance of Legal Quality for Governmental Action, 2 
LEGISPRUDENCE 231, 233 (2008). 
 31. See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: 
Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1800 (2010). 
 32. Communication from the Commission of Jan. 22, 2009, Temporary 
Framework for State Aid Measures to Support Access to Finance in the Current 
Financial and Economic Crisis, 2009 OJ (C 16) at 1. 
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document allowed European Union (EU) Member States to 
grant, on a temporary and exceptional basis, well-targeted state 
aid in order to unfreeze lending to companies and stimulate 
investment. The latter was a law adopted to accelerate the 
administrative decision-making procedure as to complex 
projects and was itself an example of a temporary and complex 
law enacted in less than seven months.33 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we explore and 
delimit the concept of ‘de-juridification,’ contrasting it to the 
term ‘juridification.’ Then we explain the relationship between 
temporary de-juridification and a state of emergency, since these 
two concepts appear to be often associated. In Part II, we present 
the concept of sunset clauses in legislation and we elaborate on 
their use during emergencies. In Part III, we analyze how such 
clauses can be a formula for de-juridification and discuss notable 
historical and contemporary examples. Finally, we conclude 
with some critical analysis of the past and the present use of 
sunset clauses as a de-juridification mechanism in times of 
crisis. We aim in Part IV to draw conclusions for future reference 
and pose suggestions for a meaningful framework for temporary 
de-juridification. 
II. JURIDIFICATION AND DE-JURIDIFICATION 
The concept of de-juridification is often mentioned in 
literature,34 but rarely defined. At first sight, this term seems to 
suggest “fewer rules,” which might convey a positive 
development in a world inhabited by thousands of unnecessary 
rules. However, this is an oversimplification of both the 
phenomenon of extending the influence of law to new social 
areas (juridification) and the process of making law disappear 
strategically (de-juridification). Both concepts are complex and 
ambivalent since they transmogrify into a deeper understanding 
of the interaction between different branches of government.35 
 
 33. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 34. See, e.g., Guy Neave, On the Cultivation of Quality, Efficiency and 
Enterprise: An Overview of Recent Trends in Higher Education in Western 
Europe, 1986–1988, 23 EURO. J. EDUC. 7, 13 (1988) (contrasting the 
“juridification of British higher education” with that in other European 
countries like the Netherlands, France, Sweden, and Finland, which introduced 
“a new flexibility to systems of control and evaluation precisely by lessening the 
weight of formal legal control”). 
 35. See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, 
CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS 4 (2009) (“Juridification is not the 
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Therefore, to get an understanding of temporary de-
juridification, a core concept in this Article, one must first study 
its companion, juridification, that has captivated the attention 
of literature for a longer interval.36 
In this Article, we argue that both juridification and de-
juridification are transnational problems since they are found in 
most Western countries.37 Today, we live in a world of national 
and supranational rules, rights, and institutions that aim to 
predict and regulate every single step we take. Juridification 
underscores legal attempts to “colonize society” and conquer new 
frontiers.38 This metaphor refers to the tendency to over-
regulate society, seeking any aspect which might be relevant 
from a regulatory point of view. This international trend to 
juridify39 has been translated not only into an increase in the 
amount of rules and individual rights, but also into a 
“reallocation of power to autonomous institutions such as the 
courts.”40 
The process of juridification is sometimes ambivalent, as we 
will explain in the following section, because more rules do not 
always mean more rights. However, as we mentioned previously, 
fewer rules are not necessarily a more democratic alternative for 
 
product of an imperial judiciary imposing its will or of an abdicating legislature 
of weak executive . . . . Juridification is, instead, the product of the interaction 
of these institutions, along with interest groups, parties, lobbyists, and policy 
entrepreneurs alike . . . . Although there certainly are instances of direct 
struggles between the branches, an exclusive focus on these obscures another 
dimension of the juridification process—the interaction between and among 
these institutions.”) (emphasis original). 
 36. See, e.g., JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE LAW (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987). For a more recent analysis, see 
Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, From Soft Law to Hard Code: The 
Juridification of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 1 (2009) (exploring the 
legal and non-legal governance mechanisms that compete in terms of dispute 
resolution and behavioral controls, and the function of law in stabilizing 
normative expectations). 
 37. See Jon Clark & Lord Wedderburn, Juridification—A Universal Trend? 
The British Experience in Labor Law, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES 
163 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987). 
 38. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., 1987). 
 39. See Lars Chr. Blichner & Anders Molander, Mapping Juridification, 14 
EUR. L.J. 36 (2008) (analyzing the concept of juridification in the European 
context). 
 40. See Anne-Mette Magnussen & Anna Banasiak, Juridification: 
Disrupting the Relationship between Law and Politics?, 19 EUR L.J. 325, 326 
(2013). 
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citizens. Resembling the opposite of juridification, de-
juridification can be both a guarantee of effective solutions and 
an instrument which can enable deprivation of fundamental 
guarantees.41 In Part I, we examine the concept of de-
juridification first by explaining where it comes from. Society 
was first juridified due to an expansion of law to more areas of 
society,42 and only then, the tendency to de-jurify emerged to 
combat bureaucracy and obstacles to rapid decision-making 
during emergencies. Second, we analyze the concept of de-
juridification and explain why the tendency to make laws 
disappear plays an important role in times of crisis. 
A.  JURIDIFICATION 
In the beginning, there was no law, only communicative 
rules developed within the intimacy of the family. With the 
growing need to interact with strangers, some form of sovereign 
was established to oversee these relations, giving rise in the 
early modern period to the initiation of a process of 
juridification.43 
The term juridification refers thus primarily to the 
relationship between state and society and more specifically, the 
modern proliferation of laws.44 This expansion of the role of law 
to different fields of society that remained for a number of years 
unregulated, e.g., sports, education, or health, has been visible 
in both the direct legal incursion of law and the voluntary 
imposition of external norms and “an increasing resort to 
 
 41. See Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, 
Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES 3, 9 (Gunther Teubner ed., 
1987). 
 42. See Ken Foster, The Juridification of Sport, in READINGS IN LAW AND 
POPULAR CULTURE 155 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds., 2011) (“Law in 
liberal democracies is increasingly invasive. The realm of what is outside legal 
regulation annually grows smaller. Law now regulates many areas of social life 
that historically have appeared immune from law.”). 
 43. See ANDREW EDGAR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HABERMAS 245 (2005) (“[A]s 
societies grow more complex, communicative competences that had been 
developed within the intimacy of the family or small tribal groups become 
inadequate for organizing fleeting and complex interactions with strangers. 
Law provides a medium for such interaction . . . . In the early modern period, 
this gives rise to the initiation of a process of juridification.”). 
 44. Id. (reflecting on Habermas’ concept of juridification and defining the 
beginning of the juridification process as “the process by which modern law 
becomes both more extensive in its scope and is more intensively organized in 
terms of its fine details”). 
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thinking and acting in a legal way without the imposition of case 
law.”45 In other words, the juridification of society has been 
translated in both the fact that legislators have enacted more 
rules in numeric terms and the fact that actors have 
acknowledged the coercive value of these legal rules and 
principles—accepting their authority.46 However, as Cicero 
predicted in Ancient Rome, “more laws” often mean “less 
justice.”47 
The term juridification does not only refer to the growing 
number of rules—sometimes badly drafted—in our society,48 but 
also to the effects of the expanding dominion of law as such. 
Individuals perceive these effects differently, with Robert A. 
Kagan explaining: 
[T]o some, law is primarily a mode of repression . . . that 
in actuality protects and legitimates existing political 
and social hierarchies. To others, in contrast, law is an 
instrument of liberation and social progress, a realm in 
which courageous litigants and judges can subject the 
preferences and prejudices of the powerful (or of selfish 
political majorities) to the constraints of reason and 
justice . . . .And to still others, the ever-expanding 
‘juridification’ of everyday social and commercial life 
imposes a stultifying formalization on human activity, 
burying us under piles of paperwork, efficiency-depleting 
 
 45. See Steve Greenfield, Guy Osborn & J.P. Rossow, The Juridification of 
Sport: A Comparative Analysis of Children’s Rugby and Cricket in England and 
South Africa, 36 J. JURID. SCI. 85, 87–88 (2011) (“[Juridification] is often used 
to describe growth or expansion of the legal field. However, this understanding 
of juridification is something of a simplification and rather crude . . . . [A] more 
significant aspect of juridification can be seen not in terms of overt legal 
intervention but rather a more indirect incorporation of legal norms. Here the 
issue can be described, to use Foster’s term, as a process of domestication. 
Rather than being focused upon direct legal incursion, this approach considers 
the voluntary imposition of external norms and an increasing resort to thinking 
and acting in a legal way without the imposition of case law or statute.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 46. On the legitimacy of law understood as the acceptance of the process of 
juridification, see ANDREW EDGAR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HABERMAS 250–51 
(2005) (“The problem of the legitimacy of law lay at the heart of the process of 
juridification. The main strands of the process may now be considered in a new 
light.”). 
 47. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 35 (44 B.C.) (“More law, less justice.”). 
 48. This is far from being a recent problem. See Ulrich Karpen, On the State 
of Legislation Studies in Europe, 7 EUR. J.L. REFORM 59, 59 (2006) (“The 
complaint that there are too many and badly drafted laws is as old as it is 
widespread, in Germany as in all countries of Europe.”). 
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regulations, and initiative-stoppers . . . .49 
As explained infra, these differences in perceived effects of 
juridification may affect the limits of what should and should not 
be de-juridified. On the one hand, juridification has thus been 
defined as the “process[es] by which the state intervenes in areas 
of social life (e.g., industrial relations, education, family, social 
welfare, commerce) in ways that limit the autonomy of 
individuals or groups to determine their own affairs.”50 
Therefore, we can relate this aspect to the first and last 
dimensions mentioned by Kagan: the expanding role of law 
limits individual autonomy since law increasingly determines 
what individuals can and cannot do. This perception has 
conferred a pejorative meaning to the word juridification which 
has also been associated in this context with “the petrification of 
class conflict” and “social norms.”51 In the words of Teubner, 
“juridification is an ugly word—as ugly as the reality which it 
describes.”52 It refers to a crusade in search of justice at all costs, 
empowered by as many laws as one can carry. Juridification is 
therefore not only an ugly word, but it is sometimes a heavy word 
which can lead to ambivalent effects, “failing to achieve the 
desired results or doing so at the cost of destroying these 
structures.”53 
Thus, juridification refers to more than the weight of over-
regulation, bureaucracy, and red tape.54 This concept often 
refers to the submission of an activity to legal regulation 
(expansion of law) or more detailed legal regulation (increasing 
density of law). This tendency is to expand the scope of law, 
which is often “referred to when the formal legislature and/or the 
judge become competent in situations where they previously 
 
 49. See Robert A. Kagan, Introduction to PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP 
SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION vii–viii (2d ed. 2009) (explaining 
the different roles of law in a society in transition). 
 50. See Jon Clark & Lord Wedderburn, Juridification—A Universal Trend? 
The British Experience in Labor Law, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST 
AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 163, 165 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) (emphasis 
added). 
 51. EMILIOS A. CHRISTODOULIDIS, LAW AND REFLEXIVE POLITICS 97 (2001). 
 52. Teubner, supra note 41, at 3. 
 53. Teubner, supra note 41, at 4. 
 54. See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 
634 (2d ed. 1997) (“Every move to juridification tends therefore to create 
complaints of bureaucracy and red tape, provoking a whiplash effect.”). 
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were not.”55 This growth is far from accepted, particularly when 
policymakers seem to have the tendency to add a large number 
of increasingly proscriptive rules to the over-regulated society 
we live in.56 Instead, as Paul Kahn remarks, “our political 
culture suffers from a dangerous disposition toward 
juridification that undermines the exercise of political 
responsibility by leadership alike.”57 This reflects a more general 
discontent with the role of law and, above all, lawyers in our 
society who “may be our leading political persons, but they are 
also the object of an intense popular distrust.”58 
Juridification may therefore be an ugly word, but it is 
frequently a necessary one. The ambivalence of this concept is 
reflected in the transition from a contemplative state to an 
interventionist one and the triumph of the rule of law over 
despotism.59 As mentioned supra, law can also be an 
“instrument of liberation,”60 and it is a weapon to fight the 
misappropriation of political power and corruption. Thus, 
juridification is not always associated with heavy bureaucracy, 
but may also represent positive efforts “to solve policy problems 
by judicial means, as well as efforts to formalize, proceduralize, 
and to automate the political process itself.”61 As Gordon 
Silverstein analogizes from the example of the United States, 
“juridification is not the product of an imperial judiciary 
 
 55. See Hans Zacher, Juridification in the Field of Social Law, in 
JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS 
OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 375, 401 
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1987). 
 56. For a criticism of regulation, see PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF 
NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD LAWS AND BROKEN GOVERNMENT 38 
(2014) (“Specific rules supposedly provide clear metrics for enforcement. That’s 
the theory, and that’s just about everyone insists on them—regulators, 
lobbyists, and politicians . . . . But the legal details often cause people to act in 
ways that undermine the public purpose.”). 
 57. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 68 (1999) (exploring the nature of contemporary legal 
scholarship and the role of the rule of law). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Bruno Debaenst, A Study on Juridification: The Case of Industrial 
Accidents in Nineteenth Century Belgium, 81 LEGAL HIST. REV. 247, 248 (2013). 
 60. See Kagan, supra note 49, at vii. 
 61. See supra SILVERSTEIN, note 35, at 3 (2009) (analyzing the juridification 
of American politics and the movement toward law, “[F]ear of the abuse of 
political power and concerns about corruption have long been met by demands 
for more law and less politics, for increasingly legalistic solutions to our 
problems, including what Lawrence Friedman calls a demand for ‘total 
justice’”). 
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imposing its will or of an abdicating legislature or weak 
executive . . . juridification is, instead, the product of the 
interaction of these institutions, along with interest groups, 
parties, lobbyists, and policy entrepreneurs alike.”62 
However, does this mean that the solution for this distrust 
should reside in widespread de-juridification, diminishing the 
empire of law? Understanding why juridification may be seen as 
an ugly result, it is now time to turn to de-juridification and 
explore whether some beauty might be found. 
B.   DE-JURIDIFICATION 
The juridification of emergency powers is important to 
prevent the executive from abusing these temporary measures 
and exercising abusive discretion in turbulent times. However, 
in times of crisis we might just want to temporarily forget the 
role of juridification and instead dismantle numerous legal 
obstacles that might stand in the way of a solution in the midst 
of an economic or political crisis. Emergencies that call for 
decisive action by the executive often include the very prospect 
of whether a certain situation can be qualified as a “state of 
exception.”63 
Although juridification is often regarded as the “enemy of 
discretion” in practice, excessive bureaucracy might actually 
hamper policy measures designed to solve crises.64 Heavy 
juridification does not guarantee that better decisions will be 
taken within a set deadline, but more frequently results in 
“blind” or automatic decisions.65 In this section, we explain first 
the concept of de-juridification, then delve into the often 
necessary de-juridification at times of crisis. 
 
 62. See id. at 4. 
 63. Bernadette Meyler, Economic Emergency and the Rule of Law, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 544 (2006) (“In its classic contours, an emergency calls for 
rapid and decisive action by the executive branch, including the act of 
designating the situation an emergency or a ‘state of exception.’ Declaring an 
emergency means setting aside a normal state of affairs or acknowledging that 
such a departure has already occurred.”). 
 64. See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 31, at 1856 (referring to the 
‘legalization’ of the use of emergency powers and ‘its discontents’). 
 65. See Alex Brenninkmeijer, Dejuridisering [De-Juridification], 1 
NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 6, 7 (2011) (discussing the problem of increasing 
regulatory pressure caused by intense juridification and the need to move 
toward de-juridification). 
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1.  Definition 
De-juridification is defined as the erosion of law or the legal 
dimension of our relationship with society, leaving certain social 
actors outside official compulsion. De-juridification should not be 
confused with de-regulation, which typically refers to the 
removal of government regulatory controls from an industry and 
in some cases, has resulted in the re-regulation of multiple 
sectors.66 De-juridification goes much further and refers to the 
politicization and the adoption of a non-legal approach to societal 
conflicts that aims to comply with a necessity. This is 
encapsulated in the Latin proverb necessitas non habet legem, 
and was further analyzed by Machiavelli.67 While juridification 
refers to the pathological growth of the power of law, de-
juridification—often its symmetrical phenomenon—reflects its 
reduction, which can be translated into fewer procedures and 
rules, but not necessarily the non-involvement of the state.68 As 
a result, a broader role for the executive and a greater 
empowerment of private actors vis-à-vis public actors, namely 
the legislature may emerge. 
The concept of de-juridification conveys the idea of a less 
‘legalistic’ approach to society which governments in different 
countries have tried to concretize via enacting fewer rules and 
less clearly defined norms for conduct. This has been realized 
through framework legislation,69 moving from public law to 
 
 66. See, e.g., GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, DEREGULATION OR REREGULATION? 
REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES (1990).  
     67. “Necessity has no law.” See NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, ch. 12 
(Peter E. Bondanella ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1515). 
 68. See ALFIO MASTROPAOLO, IS DEMOCRACY A LOST CAUSE? PARADOXES 
OF AN IMPERFECT INVENTION 109 (Clare Tame trans., 2011) (“Juridification is 
the offspring of ‘constitutional democracy’ and basic rights . . . . Granted that in 
many cases juridification corresponds to a symmetrical phenomenon of de-
juridification, albeit more contained, neither are imaginable without the 
state.”). 
 69. See WIM DUBBINK, ASSISTING THE INVISIBLE HAND: CONTESTED 
RELATIONS BETWEEN MARKET, STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 108 (2003) (“A society 
is becoming more juridified and there are normative objections to this process. 
At the same time, a process of de-juridification is taking place. This process is 
due to the fact that laws contain less and less clearly defined norms for conduct. 
Laws are turning into the so-called framework laws: laws which only become 
meaningful by virtue of an additional layer of content drawn up by the civil 
service.”). Framework legislation typically outlines goals and features of 
legislation and establishes rules for delegation to the executive. See Elizabeth 
Garrett, The Purpose of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
717, 718 (2004) (“Framework legislation creates rules that structure 
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contracts with private entities and the de-judicialization of 
government benefit programs.70 However, de-juridification does 
not only mean that unnecessary bureaucratic rules will 
disappear, but also that rights may be suspended and courts 
may be marginalized during times of crisis. This typically occurs 
on a temporary basis through the use of sunset clauses, as we 
will explain in Part II, which justifies our focus on temporary de-
juridification. 
Regina Kreide asserts that de-juridification is concretized in 
three aspects: 1) de-formalization of private law (e.g., through 
the expansion of privatization processes in health, military, and 
security);71 2) missing separation of powers in a multi-level 
system through greater decentralization of power; and 3) 
exclusion of a great part of the global population from access to 
money, knowledge, power, and judicial protection.72 In a 
juridified world, “laws colonize society,” but in a de-juridified 
world, we face the risk that “power and money” will end up 
colonizing it.73 This risk is particularly present in times ruled by 
the dialectics of fear and panic. 
2.  De-Juridification and States of Emergency 
The 2008–09 economic crisis and numerous terrorist attacks 
 
congressional lawmaking; these laws establish internal procedures that will 
shape legislative deliberation and voting with respect to certain laws or 
decisions in the future. They are laws about the congressional lawmaking 
process itself. Although frameworks often have an effect on the substance of the 
laws to which they apply, the frameworks themselves are purely internal rules 
relating to a particular set of legislative actions.”). 
 70. See HARLOW & RAWLINGS, supra note 54, at 634 (“[W]e have seen this 
effect most clearly in the move from public law to contract, not notably 
successful, in securing de-juridification. Similarly, we noted the move to de-
judicialize social security adjudication.”). 
 71. De-juridification concretized in the privatization of public tasks can 
raise numerous concerns as to the quality and availability of the services, as 
well as accountability problems. See, e.g., Andrew Bentz, Privatization and Its 
Discontents, 63 EMORY L.J. 263 (2013) (providing an overview of the multiple 
challenges of privatization); Laura A. Dickinson, Regulating the Privatized 
Security Industry: The Promise of Public/Private Governance, 63 EMORY L.J. 
417 (2013) (on private military companies); See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Mino eds., 
2009). 
 72. See Regina Kreide, The Ambivalence of Juridification. On Legitimate 
Governance in the International Context, 2 GLOBAL JUST.: THEORY, PRAC., 
RHETORIC 18, 22 (2009). 
 73. See HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM CIVIC FRIENDSHIP TO A 
GLOBAL LEGAL COMMUNITY 116 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2005). 
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in Europe and the United States have taught us that excessive 
juridification cannot shield us from these risks. Instead, 
emergencies will force legislators to rethink and reinvent a 
number of existing rules, and sometimes set aside a number of 
them. Indeed, any emergency—political, economic, or natural—
will involve a form of government action that may infringe on 
constitutionally protected political and economic rights and 
liberties.74 Although the literature has distinguished between 
the maintenance of a core of constitutional rights that should 
remain untouched by a declaration of emergency and the need 
to accept some malleability at the level of economic rights, the 
truth is that some rights will necessarily be derogated in times 
of crisis.75 At these times, however, government will often claim 
that de-juridification is only temporary and will assume that it 
is possible to rewind to the status quo ante.76 
A temporary limitation of fundamental rights, suspension of 
constitutional protections, and the acceleration of legal 
procedures are sometimes unavoidable consequences of 
emergency measures adopted to combat terrorism and provide 
firm reactions to potential national security threats.77 Adequate 
and rapid state actions are necessary in this context since 
terrorists may feel that their target is not just an anonymous 
citizen, but instead the state itself.78 As Günter Frankenberg 
 
 74. See Bernadette Meyler, Economic Emergency and the Rule of Law, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 559 (2006) (“In the United States, the judiciary has tended 
to accede to executive or legislative action limiting individual liberties during 
emergency, either by postponing decision until after a crisis has concluded, or 
by affirming the necessity of the government’s actions.”). 
 75. For a distinction between different types of emergencies and allowed 
derogations from constitutional rights, see id. at 559. See also Mark Tushnet, 
Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. 
REV. 273 (2003). 
 76. See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 
480, 534–35 (2008) (arguing that sunset clauses can be used to promote a 
continuous process of learning and ensure policy reversibility). 
 77. See Gabriel Malor, How Not to Fight Terrorism, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 28, 
2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/ article/397317/how-not-fight-
terrorism-gabriel-malor (discussing the unconstitutionality and potential 
ineffectiveness of a bill determining that terrorists should be stripped from 
citizenship). “Because of its constitutional infirmity it would never work as 
billed by its proponents. Instead, it would mobilize an army of bureaucrats at 
Justice, State, and Homeland Security to start sniping away at Americans’ 
rights of citizenship and travel.” Id. 
 78. See Todd Sandler, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Overview, 
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1–2 (2014) (“[T]errorists seek to circumvent normal 
channels for political change by traumatizing the public with brutal acts so that 
governments feel compelled to either address terrorist demands or divert public 
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explains, “terrorist attacks need primarily to be repelled not 
because they endanger innocent citizens but because they attack 
the very heart of the state . . . [casting] doubt on [the] capability 
of the state, [and threatening] the normative foundation of its 
existence.”79 Timely and effective responses to terrorism and 
other types of crises require extraordinary approaches—as the 
saying goes, “all is fair in love and war.” 
By distinguishing between a state of normal operations and 
a state of emergency, states might be requested to de-juridify on 
the legislative, administrative, and judicial levels.80 Such de-
juridification, often translated into the temporary limitation of 
constitutional protections, should, nonetheless, be limited and 
circumscribed to the duration of situations of “exceptional and 
imminent danger.”81 However, history has made it clear that 
this is not always the case. Legislating at times of crisis is a 
challenging task, which implies taking into consideration an 
atypical scenario of rescission and enactment, as well as the 
limitation of basic rights, in an attempt to reconcile the present 
with past and future. This challenge is developed in Part III of 
this article. 
III.  TIME, EMERGENCIES, AND SUNSETS 
In this Part, we shift our conceptual analysis from de-
juridification to its temporary character in times of crisis. As 
mentioned earlier, emergencies are thought to be temporary and 
thus require measures that are terminated at the end of a 
certain period.82 In order to guarantee this termination, sunset 
clauses are used to prevent normalization of the state of 
exception and to enable legal frameworks to keep up with the 
 
funds into hardening potential targets . . . . These and countless other incidents 
since 9/11 indicate that the government must allocate resources in an effective 
and measured manner to counterterrorism activities so that terrorists cannot 
circumvent legitimate political processes or cause significant economic losses. 
These losses may involve reduced foreign direct investment, lower economic 
growth, less trade, reduced tourism, or lost values of stock and bond indexes.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 79. GÜNTER FRANKENBERG, POLITICAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE EROSION OF 
THE RULE OF LAW: NORMALIZING THE STATE OF EXCEPTION 202 (2014). 
 80. See Alan Greene, Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The 
Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 
GER. L.J. 1764 (2011). 
 81. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 222. 
 82. See Malor, supra note 77. 
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current state of affairs. However, law is usually not keen on 
remaining current with the evolution of society.83 Rather, both 
at the domestic and international levels, “delay is [normally] the 
rule,”84 and rules that were supposed to be temporary often 
remain after the period of crisis.85 In fact, this is a problem 
common to both times of war and peace, since there is a tendency 
for policies and laws to persist even “[w]hen [their] original 
rationale is no longer applicable or has been proven invalid.”86 
In this Part, we start by analyzing why the law has a 
troublesome relationship with time. It appears to be challenging 
to strike a balance between the past (state of normalcy where 
citizens can exercise their rights), the present (state of 
emergency where it is necessary to derogate some of these rights 
so as to make rapid decisions), and the future (a state of 
normalcy where any effects of temporary measures must be 
erased). After exploring law’s nostalgia with the past, we delve 
into the concept and functions of sunset clauses, arguing that 
such clauses could close the gap between a state of normalcy 
(juridification) and a state of emergency (de-juridification). 
A.   LAW AND TIME 
Although the idea of permanence appears to be traditionally 
associated with legislation, law is inevitably constrained by 
time.87 Laws are doomed to face a destiny like the mythological 
character Kronos88: they overthrow existing laws, have a period 
 
 83. See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and 
the Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 184 (2001) 
(discussing the relationship between the evolution of technology and 
international law and the interaction between the creation and change of 
international rules and technological pressures). “[I]t is often the case that 
technologically induced change to international law occurs in fits and starts, 
sometimes in a timely fashion and sometimes after considerable delay. 
Normally, delay is the rule in the formation of international law.” Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Frank H. Easterbrook et al., Showcase Panel IV: A Federal Sunset 
Law, the Federalist Society 2011 National Lawyers Convention, 16 TEX. REV. L. 
& POL. 339, 348 (2011) (explaining the reluctance to terminate laws is not 
surprising since “it’s much more difficult to repeal a law than it is to pass it in 
the first place, because, once enacted, an army of special interests surrounds 
each law”). 
 86. See Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, Policy Persistence, 89 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1327, 1327–28 (1999) (describing the difficulty of terminating policies). 
 87. E.g., FRANK FAGAN, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: 
TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT LEGISLATION (2013). 
 88. Kronos was a mythological character, “the Titan god of time and the 
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to reign, but are destined to be overthrown again by the next 
generation. Like Kronos, legislators often experience the 
“nostalgia of eternity,” refusing their mortality as well as that of 
their rules.89 This nostalgia is often translated in the 
‘détemporalisation’ of law, which has been in the vanguard of 
totalitarian ideologies, cultural crises, and profound divergences 
between law and status quo.90 Professor Ost’s détemporalisation 
suggests the image of a law that has become detached from any 
temporal dimension, as if it must inevitably govern our society 
without end.91 Instead of enhancing legal certainty,92 and 
increasing the effectiveness and deterrent effect of laws with the 
course of time,93 longstanding laws easily become obsolete and 
are converted into both sources of satire94 and abuse.95 
On one hand, the disconnection between time and society 
can be caused by a refusal to accept evolution or changed 
circumstances, or on the other hand, by rupture. Law and its 
institutions are the result of incremental change and profound 
transitions. If the law is unable to advance at the pace of society, 
technology, and the economy, the law will gradually lose effect.96 
The necessary relationship between law and time should mirror 
a balance between continuity, evolution, and rupture. This is 
particularly exacerbated in times of crisis, since temporary 
phenomena such as wars, economic instability, or political 
 
ages, especially time where regarded as destructive and all-devouring.” Kronos, 
THEOI GREEK MYTHOLOGY, http://www.theoi.com/Titan/TitanKronos.html (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
 89. See FRANCOIS OST, LE TEMPS DU DROIT 14–15 (1999). 
 90. Id. at 15–16. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Sofia Ranchordás, Sunset Clauses and Experimental Regulations: 
Blessing or Curse for Legal Certainty?, 36 STATUTE L. REV. 28 (2015) (exploring 
the different dimensions of the principle of legal certainty and arguing that 
temporary legislation does not necessarily create legal uncertainty, but can 
further it because it creates sufficient certainty in the long run). 
 93. See Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36–38 
(1983) (arguing that the legal certainty of laws decreases over time); Tom Baker 
et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA 
L. REV. 443, 449–464 (2004) (positing that deterrence may increase if law is less 
predictable and sanctions are uncertain). 
 94. See, e.g., UK Chooses ‘Most Ludicrous Laws’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/7081038.stm (discussing outdated laws on duels). 
 95. E.g., Melissa J. Mitchell, Cleaning Out the Closet: Using Sunset 
Provisions to Clean Up Cluttered Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L.J. 1671 (2005). 
 96. See GARY E. MARCHANT ET AL., THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN 
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT: THE PACING 
PROBLEM 19–30 (Anthony Mark Cutter et al. eds., 2011) (outlining the “pacing 
problem in the context of regulation of emerging technologies”). 
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upheaval usually require temporary and exceptional legislative 
measures.97 Rupture of the status quo might be temporary in the 
latter situations, but it can also become permanent when 
legislators are confronted with a demand for innovative 
institutions and instruments that replace the status quo. 98 
The relationship between time and law is also visible in the 
need to set a timetable for legislation. Timing rules, i.e., 
determining whether the benefits of a rule are created sooner or 
later is another dimension of the relationship between time and 
law, which can not only prevent the mentioned disconnection but 
also maximize the effects of a law in light of uncertainty.99 An 
example of this inflexion point are the triggering circumstances 
which might allow the President of the United States to declare 
a national emergency. 
Emergency powers must therefore be constrained in some 
manner in order to guarantee timely legal checks before further 
delegation and/or fast-tracked decisions and regulation.100 This 
is often concretized by introducing sunset clauses in existing 
statutes or enacting ad hoc emergency legislation.101 
B.  EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AND SUNSET CLAUSES 
Sunset clauses102 (or provisions) are dispositions that 
 
 97. See Haskell, infra note 98. 
 98. In this context, it is important to distinguish between rupture and 
revolution. E.g., John D. Haskell, The Strategies of Rupture in International 
Law: The Retrenchment of Conservative Politics and the Emancipatory Potential 
of the Impossible, 13 GER. L.J. 468, 468 (2012) (“Rupture is not necessarily the 
same as speaking about revolution, or even emancipation for that matter, 
because it does not necessitate any giving up of a certain system of ideas or 
authority, at least not in any longstanding sense.”). 
 99. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal 
Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 552, 558 (2007). 
 100. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 31, at 1805. 
 101. See generally ANNA JASIAK, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON AD HOC 
LEGISLATION (2011) (comparing the United States, Germany, and the 
Netherlands). 
 102. It is important to distinguish between sunset clauses and sunrise 
clauses. While sunset clauses determine the termination of a law or some of its 
dispositions, sunrise clauses, on the contrary, only determine that a law will 
come into effect later on a certain date. Until that period, the clause “lies 
dormant.” MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS: AMNESTIES AND THE SEARCH 
FOR JUSTICE 142 (2009) (“[S]unrise clause . . . is a clause in a law that provides 
for the coming into force rather than the termination of portions of the law . . . 
after a specific date in the future and upon the satisfaction of specific 
conditions.”). 
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determine the expiry of a law or regulation within a pre-
determined period.103 Such provisions are conceived to 
automatically erase legislation that is no longer necessary 
because it has fulfilled its function or is no longer effective. 
Before the law sunsets, it is generally subject to a final 
evaluation. This is particularly true if there is a review trigger 
or a “Henry VIII clause” providing a law will be amended by 
secondary legislation.104 Although a sunset clause is designed to 
terminate a piece of legislation at a certain point in time, the 
latter may always be reauthorized on exceptional grounds.105 
Sunset clauses allow for regulations to adjust to changing 
social or technological circumstances and can be included in 
emerging legislation to ensure that an enactment returns to the 
pre-emergency situation. Sunset clauses may be motivated by 
four main rationales: overcoming legislative inaction, generating 
a temporary placeholder, allowing future decisions to be made 
with better information, or protecting against legislative 
panic.106 This Article focuses on the last rationale, which is 
usually present in counterterrorism legislation. 
Under a state of emergency, more powers are concentrated 
in the hands of the executive, which often means that public 
officials are allowed to limit fundamental guarantees, enacting 
‘extra-legal measures’ to protect a nation confronted with grave 
peril. As Oren Gross explains, the adequate enactment of these 
measures “[m]ay strengthen rather than weaken, and result in 
more rather than less, long-term constitutional fidelity and 
 
 103. See Sunset Clause, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/site-
information/glossary/sunset-clause/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2015) (“A provision in a 
Bill that gives it an ‘expiry date’ once it is passed into law. ‘Sunset clauses’ are 
included in legislation when it is felt that Parliament should have the chance 
to decide on its merits again after a fixed period.”). 
 104. See Henry VIII Clause, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/
site-information/glossary/henry-viii-clauses/ (“The Government sometimes 
adds this provision to a Bill to enable the Government to repeal or amend it 
after it has become an Act of Parliament. The provision enables primary 
legislation to be amended or repealed by subordinate legislation, with or 
without further Parliamentary scrutiny. Such provisions are known as Henry 
VIII clauses, so named from the Statute of Proclamations 1539 which gave King 
Henry VIII power to legislate by proclamation.”). However, these instruments 
would be incompatible with the U.S. doctrine of non-delegation since they 
transfer the power to amend primary legislation to the executive. See J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
 105. See Lewis Anthony Davis, Review Procedures and Public Accountability 
in Sunset Legislation: An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 
393 (1981). 
 106. See Ip, supra note 18, at 82. 
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commitment to the rule of law.”107 Since times of crisis produce 
a tension of tragic dimensions between democratic values and 
responses to emergencies, this tension is often solved by 
introducing a sunset clause in emergency provisions.108 Ex ante 
evaluations and evidence-based policy making play a limited 
role in critical times, meaning that legislation can be hastily 
adopted without sufficient empirical support.109 In this context, 
sunset clauses aim to guarantee that the circumstances that 
justified a certain piece of extraordinary delegation to the 
executive are reassessed after a set period. 
In the United Kingdom, review and sunset clauses have 
been favored in order to improve the scrutiny of fast-track110 and 
emergency legislation, most notably, the law that temporarily 
suspended the local government in Northern Ireland after the 
growth of urban terrorism in the area.111 In 2009, the 
Constitution Committee of the House of Lords analyzed fast-
track legislation and pled for a presumption in favor of the use 
of sunset clauses in the context of emergency legislation. The 
Committee explained: 
[W]here fast-track bills are used, there needs to be an 
additional safeguard . . . . [I]n such cases, there should 
instead be a presumption in favor of the use of a sunset 
clause. By this process, a piece of legislation would expire 
after a certain date, unless Parliament chooses either to 
renew it or to replace it with a further piece of legislation 
subject to the normal legislative process.112 
Sunset clauses have been included in different examples of 
emergency counterterrorism legislation.113 In the United States, 
 
 107. See Gross, supra note 24, at 1023. 
 108. Id. at 1028. 
 109. Van Stolk & Fazekas, supra note 21, at 163. 
 110. Fast-track legislation refers to legislation enacted in deviation of 
normal legislative procedures and timetables, namely to respond to ‘urgent’ 
situations. “Bills . . . which the Government of the day represents to Parliament 
must be enacted swiftly . . . and then [the former] uses its power of legislative 
initiative and control of Parliamentary time to secure their passage.” SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FAST-TRACK LEGISLATION: 
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND SAFEGUARDS, HL 116-I 2008-09 (UK), http
://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/116/11604.
htm. 
 111. Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972, c. 22, sch. 1(5). 
 112. E.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 110. 
 113. See Finn, supra note 13. 
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a number of sunset clauses were introduced in the USA 
PATRIOT Act in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.114 
Sixteen sections of this legislation were originally meant to 
sunset on December 31, 2005. These provisions were included in 
order to limit the duration of measures constraining the margins 
of certain constitutional rights to a four-year period.115 The Act 
was however reauthorized several times in the following years 
following very limited evaluation—though many provisions 
expired in the summer of 2015 and then were resurrected in a 
new form in the USA FREEDOM Act.116 Although some of its 
provisions expired this year after a long debate in Congress, a 
few hours later, they reemerged in the USA Freedom Act. 
Other countries followed this trend. In the last decade, the 
inclusion of these clauses has been discussed in Germany and 
the Netherlands. In Germany, the Counterterrorism Act 
introduced several limitations to rights established by the Basic 
Law on a temporary basis in order to safeguard national 
security.117 An analogous provision was enacted in the 
Netherlands (Wet Bestuurlijke Maatregelen Nationale 
Veiligheid).118 Advising on the constitutionality of this 
legislation, the Dutch Council of State argued that a sunset 
clause should be introduced so as to limit extraordinary powers 
and periodically assess the necessity and proportionality factors. 
Periodic evaluation invited the government to weigh the 
 
 114. See generally Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1237 (2004) (discussing the application of a sunset rationale to 
judicial decision-making in the post-9/11 world). USA PATRIOT stands for 
“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” Id. 
 115. Examples include interception of communications, disclosure of 
communication, and surveillance orders. Section 224 of the USA Patriot Act 
contained a sunset clause of five years. However, a number of sections were 
renewed (e.g., sharing of criminal information and single-jurisdiction search 
warrants). See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272 
(2011). 
 116. USA FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015); Van 
Stolk & Fazekas, supra note 21, at 161. The USA Patriot Act was to initially 
sunset in 2005. Some of its sections were made permanent in that year while 
others were extended until 2010. 
 117. Gesetz zur des Internationalen Terrorismus [Act for the Combat of 
International Terrorism], Jan. 9, 2002, BGBL I, at 361, no. 3 (Ger.). A day before 
these measures expired, a new law extending these limitations was enacted. 
 118. See generally STATE COUNCIL OF THE NETHERLANDS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
MEASURES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, OPINION AND FURTHER REPORT II (2005–
06) (describing the rules governing decision-making and the imposition of 
restrictive measures on persons for the protection of national security). 
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restriction imposed by a specific emergency policy against the 
continuing severity of the state of emergency. The opinion of the 
Council to include a sunset clause was not welcomed by the 
Dutch Minister of Justice, who refused to introduce it, affirming 
that “terrorism cannot be regarded as a transitory problem.”119 
The good intentions of the Dutch Council of State were clearly 
misunderstood by the minister. Although terrorism is indeed a 
lasting problem, it is important to limit the time extraordinary 
powers are granted to the executive in order to guarantee that 
these are revisited after a determined period of time. 
Compared to unpredictable natural disasters, terrorism 
carries both certain and uncertain elements—we know it exists, 
but we are unable to predict when and where it will occur. At 
times of higher risk, e.g., after the 9/11 attacks, or more recently, 
when the United States started launching airstrikes on the 
Islamic State in August 2014120—states might need to consider 
new emergency measures or decide to review the effectiveness 
and proportionality of existing ones. The use of sunset clauses 
can therefore be placed in the context of a “lesser evil logic for 
dealing with emergencies” that implies the suspension of 
constitutional protections and the transfer of significant 
extraordinary powers to the executive.121 Sunset clauses serve 
several functions: limiting unnecessary temporal de-
juridification, guaranteeing enhanced legislative oversight of 
emergency powers, ensuring that extraordinary measures are 
not normalized, and building consensus around potentially 
controversial measures. 
Consequently, sunset clauses renew legislative oversight, 
wake legislators out of their natural inertia,122 and activate the 
army of special interests that surrounds a law upon 
 
 119. Id. at 12–13 (arguing that an evaluation clause—rather than a sunset 
clause—would suffice to guarantee that the extraordinary competences would 
not remain for a longer period than necessary). 
 120. See, e.g., Jason Groves, Terror Target Britain: More Armed Police to 
Patrol Streets as Threat Level is Raised to Its Highest for Years and Prime 
Minister Warns that We Are in the Fanatics’ Sights, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2737724/Terror-attack-UK-highly-
likely-warns-Home-Secretary-Theresa-May-threat-level-raised-severe.html 
(describing Prime Minister Cameron’s Aug. 28, 2014 speech on terrorism). 
 121. See BOB BRECHER ET AL., DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF TERRORISM: 
INTERROGATING TERROR 3 (2010). 
 122. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A 
Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1676 (2002) (remarking that some policies 
may be entrenched partly due to dependence and inertia). 
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enactment123—attempting to ensure that emergency measures 
do not live beyond the political, social, or economic crises that 
justified enactment. “Legislative oversight of administration is a 
nexus of administrative-political relation . . . .[T]he behavior of 
legislators towards administrators when exercising their 
oversight powers can therefore be viewed as an 
operationalization of underlying normative values regarding 
political-administrative relations.”124 However, this 
operationalization can in some cases undermine, or even 
destroy, original legislative intent. This feeling was prevalent in 
the 1970s.125 As a result, a new instrument of legislative 
oversight was added to the representatives’ toolbox, i.e., sunset 
clauses. As explained infra, sunset clauses were not entirely new 
legislative instruments in common law systems, but their 
adoption as review and termination tools was innovative at the 
time. 
Gathering consensus for controversial pieces of legislation 
that involves the limitation of constitutional protections can also 
be far from a simple task. Divided government and significant 
political opposition are often visible in legislative fragmentation 
and a lack of provisions ensuring the continuity of legal regimes 
or imposing future reconsideration.126 Sunset clauses create 
more room for political bargaining and swiftly achieve the social 
and political consensus that would have otherwise been absent 
among legislators. Opponents to a specific law or provision 
within it will be more willing to pass it, if there is a guarantee 
that the previously existing status quo will return after the 
sunset.127 This occurs when there is a conflict of multiple 
interests or when information as to the potential (negative) 
effects of law might be lacking. This promise to erase and rewind 
can be particularly relevant in the context of economic and 
 
 123. See Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity and 
the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 252, 254 (2008). 
 124. See Mordecai Lee, Political-Administrative Relations in State 
Government: A Legislative Perspective, 29 INT’L. J. PUB. ADMIN. 1021, 1023 
(2006). 
 125. See Mark B. Bickle, The National Sunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 209 (1985). 
 126. Maltzman & Shipan, supra note 123, at 255 (arguing that political 
conditions at the time of the enactment of a law—namely the existence of a 
divided government—can influence the probability that a law will be amended 
and explaining how sunset provisions are substantial vehicles for encouraging 
the building of coalitions and encouraging a law to be revisited). 
 127. Tom Ginsburg et al., Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and 
Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 291, 337 (2014). 
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political crises.128 
IV.  DE-JURIDIFICATION IN TIME 
This Part focuses on de-juridification of the legal order in 
times of crisis pertaining to rights jurisprudence. Throughout 
history, policymakers on both the national and international 
levels have equally relied on the politicization rather than 
juridification during emergencies.129 A careful examination of 
the reaction of lawmakers in these turbulent times will show 
that the trend of politicization is exemplified by the temporary 
sunset of basic guarantees and the subsequent deactivation of 
the courts, in combination or separately with temporary 
delegation to the executive. 
The practice of de-juridification through the adoption of 
sunset clauses or similar temporary provisions is not a modern 
phenomenon, nor is it confined to a single legal tradition. 
Although these emergency measures were adopted on a 
temporary basis, the principle of separation of powers was 
placed in peril as a matter of course. Emergency laws have an 
explicit impact on rights that may be openly asserted, while 
separation of powers effects are equally significant, but 
generally indirect since the system of divided roles is perceived 
as a guarantee of liberties.130 
The first subsection that follows explores the early use of 
temporary suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus in United 
States. The following subsection discusses the frequent use of 
sunset clauses to de-juridify in the United Kingdom during the 
First and Second World Wars. A third subsection focuses on the 
reasons and causes of de-juridification during emergencies and 
discusses its impact on fundamental rights. The final subsection 
 
 128. Maltzman & Shipan, supra note 123, at 255. 
 129. See Ludwik Ehrlich, British Emergency Legislation During the Present 
War, 5 CAL. L. REV. 433, 436 (1917) (showing that the exigencies of the war 
forced the UK Parliament to juridify aspects of social policies, such as the 
obligation of British nationals to register with the National Registration Act 
1915 or the military service in the regular army with the Military Service Act 
1916). 
 130. The allocation of powers among different institutions does not 
encompass only functional considerations to increase efficiencies. It is argued 
that the decentralization of power prevents the development of authoritarian 
regimes. This idea that the separation of powers serves the liberty of the 
subjects was first expressed by Montesquieu and later by Madison. See 
MONTESQUIEU: THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 162 (Anne Cohler et al. eds., 1989); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
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analyzes the impact of temporary legislation on separation of 
powers, with a particular focus on judicial functions. 
A. THE SEEDS OF DE-JURIDIFICATION IN THE SUSPENSION OF 
HABEAS CORPUS 
The procedural development of law has been a general 
concern of scholars with various approaches, ranging from 
conventional styles like Savigny that blur legal and societal 
evolution,131 to those such as Watson that advocate more 
nuanced and controversial approaches based on imitation and 
legal transplantation.132 The rule of law has gradually been 
enhanced, the spectrum of law has expanded to cover every 
eventuality and jus became the predominant element of society. 
This naturally led to a juridification of the social aspects of life. 
Likewise, the development of human rights jurisprudence had 
an equivalent progress.133 The legal framework of the protection 
of rights therefore progressively became more impermeable, 
covering wider ranges of law. 
The writ of habeas corpus has played a significant role in 
this process. This writ has served multiple functions since its 
thirteenth century origins;134 however, its crystallization only 
took place in the seventeenth century with the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1679.135 The enactment of this Act—the emergence of the 
‘great writ’—has been called one of the most efficient guarantees 
of liberty.136 Fundamentally, this instrument challenges 
unlawful arrest and detention.137 Habeas corpus is also 
technically a procedural remedy and not a right,138 but as Dicey 
 
 131. See 1 FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN 
LAW (William Holloway trans., Madras, J. Higginbotham, 1867). 
 132. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW (1974) (challenging the traditional perception that there is 
a close connection between the evolution of law and the society in which it 
operates). 
 133. See TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 10 (2010) (marking the 
development of the most important historical events in the rule of law, including 
the writ habeas corpus and the abolition of torture). For a more thorough 
account of the history of the rule of law, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE 
OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004). 
 134. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 
(2010). 
 135. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2. 
 136. See HALLIDAY, supra note 134. 
 137. See BINGHAM, supra note 133, at 13. 
 138. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
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said, the great writ may “declare no principle and define no 
rights, but they are for practical purposes worth a hundred 
constitutional articles guaranteeing individual liberty.”139 
Though important, history has shown that this writ has been the 
target of temporary de-juridification. 
Interestingly, the first temporary suspension occurred less 
than a decade later in 1688.140 The temporary suspension of 
habeas corpus then became a common practice during the 
eighteenth century when various plots against the Crown 
emerged or threats of invasion surfaced.141 During the transition 
to the new Hanoverian regime, another habeas corpus 
suspension act was recorded;142 the end of the century saw not 
only a series of successive habeas corpus suspension acts,143 but 
also legislation with a three year sunset clause, which forbade 
meetings of more than fifty people without prior permission from 
a magistrate.144 
On one hand, suspension of habeas corpus removed a 
sensitive area of action from judicial control. The decision to 
maintain imprisonment or not thus became an inherently 
political decision. This practice is rooted in Roman 
jurisprudence, with Cicero famously declaring that inter arma 
enim silent leges (“in time of war, the law falls silent”).145 Several 
centuries on, Rousseau observed that in times of emergencies 
“the inflexibility of the laws, which keeps them from bending to 
events, can in some cases render them pernicious, and through 
them cause the ruin of a State in crisis.”146 
On the other hand, repercussions from the suspension of 
 
CONSTITUTION 120 (1982). 
 139. Id. at 118. 
 140. Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2. See also MARK A. 
THOMSON, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND: 1642 TO 1801 at 286 
(1938) (“The passing of the Act desired by the Commons implied that henceforth 
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and for such time and in such manner as Parliament pleased.”). 
 141. MARK KNIGHTS, HANOVERIAN BRITAIN 5 (2011). 
 142. Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 1722, 9 Geo. 1, c. 1. 
 143. See Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 1714, 1 Geo. 1, c. 8 (“[T]o empower 
his Majesty to secure and detain such Persons as his Majesty shall suspect are 
conspiring against his Person and Government”). See also Habeas Corpus 
Suspension Act, 1798, 38 Geo. 3, c. 36. 
 144. Seditious Meetings Act, 1795, 36 Geo. 3, c. 8. 
 145. MARCI TULLII CICERONIS, PRO TITO ANNIO MILONE, 4 (52 B.C.), 
https://archive.org/details/oratioprotitoann00ciceuoft. 
 146. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 138 (Victor Gourevitch ed., 1997) (1762). 
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habeas corpus are equally relevant to separation of powers 
through deactivation of the courts.147 Across the Atlantic, 
suspension of habeas corpus was expressly incorporated into the 
text of the U.S. Constitution.148 In particular, President Lincoln 
suspended the writ in 1861 during the Civil War and a case 
challenging this decision was brought before the federal courts. 
In Ex parte Merryman, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney 
delivered an opinion149 questioning whether the President had 
the authority to use suspension powers without Congressional 
authorization.150 President Lincoln disregarded this ruling and 
made a choice he considered pragmatically necessary. In fact, 
during an address to a Joint Session of Congress on July 4, 1861, 
President Lincoln responded to the Court with a memorable 
quote that underscored de-juridification: “are all the laws, but 
one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest 
that one be violated?”151 Lincoln stressed that the Constitution 
is silent on which branch of government has the power to 
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 
The conflict between President Lincoln and Chief Justice 
Taney illustrates the early tension amongst the separation of 
powers and represents early de-juridification by the executive 
branch, albeit over the unequivocal disapproval of the Supreme 
Court. President Lincoln made a correct decision—or perhaps, a 
realistic one—given the peril the nation faced. Though the 
question of which branch of the government had the power to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus is still officially 
unanswered,152 Chief Justice Taney is frequently credited with 
 
 147. Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer 
From the Arguments Surrounding Ex Parte Merryman, 34 BALT. L. REV. 11 
(2005) (“[T]he question of which political branch has the power to suspend the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a classic constitutional separation of 
powers question with important consequences for civil liberties.”). 
 148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (stating that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it”). 
 149. At that time, Supreme Court justices had circuit duties and sat as trial 
judges on lower federal courts. This practice was repealed by the Judiciary Act 
of 1891. See 26 Stat. 826, § 14 (1891). See Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: 
The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753 
(2003). 
 150. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). 
 151. For more details of the dialogue between Chief Justice Taney and 
President Lincoln, see Arthur T. Downey, The Conflict Between the Chief Justice 
and the Chief Executive: Ex Parte Merryman, 31 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 262, 272 
(2006). 
 152. See Jackson, supra note 147. 
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the correct legal conclusion.153 The Merryman episode 
established a precedent though that the existence of a state of 
armed conflict is a political question that counsels judicial 
deference.154 Nonetheless, it is questionable whether this 
doctrine encompasses all cases of emergency or whether it is 
confined to armed conflict.155 
B. DE-JURIDIFICATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
A century later, emergency laws of temporary nature,156 also 
called wartime acts, clogged the statute book based on two world 
wars that monopolized Parliament’s agenda.157 Thorough 
examination of those laws shows extensive de-juridification, not 
just confined to fundamental rights areas, but also marked by 
constant centralization of powers, since power was delegated 
temporarily from Parliament to His Majesty’s government. 
In particular, during the First World War, the government 
introduced emergency legislation with temporary duration 
“until to the end of the War,”158 or for a certain period—for 
instance six months thereafter.159 In substance, most of these 
acts limited rights and freedoms. Examples of this were 
temporary suspension of freedom of assembly,160 prohibitions on 
 
 153. See CLINTON LAWRENCE ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 25–26 (1951). 
 154. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950). 
 155. This caveat is relevant to the phenomenon of terrorism due to its 
peculiar dichotomy between war and crime. Unlike war, terrorism is not 
organized and an armed conflict between states or other entities. Rather, 
terrorism involves selective attacks against civilian and governmental targets. 
See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032–
37 (2004). 
 156. However, not all emergency laws were temporary. See, e.g., 
Termination of the Present War (Definition Act), 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 59 
(empowering the King-in-Council to define the termination of the war—without 
a sunset clause). 
 157. For a detailed analysis on the emergency legislation during World War 
I, see H. Geraldine Lester, British Emergency Legislation, 7 CAL. L. REV. 323 
(1919). See also Ehrlich, supra note 129. 
 158. See, e.g., British Ships (Transfer Restriction) Act, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 21; 
National Registration Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 60. 
 159. See, e.g., Special Acts (Extension of Time) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 72; 
Price of Coal (Limitation) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 75. 
 160. Societies (Suspension of Meetings) Act, 1917, 7 Geo. 5 c. 16. 
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trading with the enemy,161 suspension of the grand jury,162 and 
a ban on strikes in industries relevant to war munitions.163 
These enactments empowered the executive, particularly the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in issues pertaining to war 
finance164 and public undertakings,165 the Home Secretary,166 
and the Prime Minister through the King-in-Council.167 Most 
importantly, emergency acts with sunset clauses also affected 
political rights, such as temporarily postponing elections168 and 
suspending re-election for ministers.169 
Likewise, in the wake of the Second World War, another 
series of emergency acts were brought forward. The most notable 
one was a temporary act to control the export of goods to 
particular countries, hence limiting freedom of contract.170 This 
Act delegated power to the Chamberlain government to regulate 
exportation and imposed criminal penalties. It provided that: 
This Act shall continue in force until such date as His 
Majesty may by Order in Council declare to be the date 
on which the emergency that was the occasion of the 
passing of this Act came to an end, and shall then expire 
except as respects things previously done or omitted to 
 
 161. See Trading With the Enemy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 87; Trading With 
the Enemy Amendment Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 79; Trading With the Enemy 
(Amendment) Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5 c. 31. 
 162. See Grand Juries (Suspension) Act, 1917, 7 Geo. 5 c. 4. 
 163. See Munitions of War Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 54. 
 164. See, e.g., Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 89; War Loan Act, 
1917, 7 & 8 Geo. 5 c. 41; Government War Obligations Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5 
c. 28. 
 165. See, e.g., Statutory Companies (Redeemable Stock) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 
5 c. 44; Statutory Undertakings (Temporary Increase of Charges) Act, 1918, 8 
& 9 Geo. 5 c. 44. 
 166. E.g., Police, Factories &c. (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1916, 6 & 7 
Geo. 5 c. 31. 
 167. See, e.g., Postponement of Payments Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 11. 
 168. See, e.g., Elections and Registration Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 11; 
Parliament and Local Elections Act, 1917, 7 Geo. 5 c. 13; Parliament and Local 
Elections (No. 2) Act, 1917, 7 & 8 Geo. 5 c. 50; Parliament and Local Elections 
Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5 c. 22. 
 169. See, e.g., Re-Election of Ministers Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5 c. 50; Re-
Election of Ministers Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5 c. 22; Re-Election of Ministers (No. 
2) Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5 c. 67. 
 170. See Import, Export, and Customs Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 
Geo. 6 c. 69. 
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be done.171 
Nevertheless, no order was ever made causing the Act to 
expire. Over forty years later, the Thatcher Government issued 
the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1987172 and the Export of 
Goods (Control) Order 1989,173 which prohibited the exportation 
of particular items to several countries, including Iraq. 
A case was brought before the Court of Appeal in 1995 
concerning these orders. In essence, the appellants argued that 
“[h]owever broad or loose a construction is to be given to ‘the 
emergency,’ it cannot rationally be said to have continued up to 
1987.”174 Therefore, the 1987 and 1989 orders were an abuse of 
power based on the 1939 Act.175 The Court acknowledged that 
the legislative intent behind the Act was the imminence of the 
Second World War, but did not allow the appeal since 
Parliament had the opportunity to repeal the Act during the 
intervening period but presumably chose not to.176 
This case illustrates the potential extent of emergency de-
juridification and the absurd results that sometimes follow. The 
rationale behind this choice seems to be that expediency ranks 
higher than legality. However, this can become dangerous when 
what was initially perceived as temporary becomes the new 
status quo with a permanent character. 
C.  RIGHTS IN PAUSE 
Crisis management is always a daunting task.177 
Diachronically, the dilemma is reflected by the thoughts of 
Abraham Lincoln, who wondered, “is there, in all republics, this 
inherent and fatal weakness? Must a government, of necessity, 
 
 171. Id. at § 9(3). 
 172. Export of Goods (Control) Order, 1987, SI 1987/2070. 
 173. Export of Goods (Control) Order 1989, SI 1987/2376. 
 174. R v. Blackledge [1995] 1 EWCA (Crim) 326. 
 175. See id. 
 176. Id. at 5. In reality, the court showed deference to the legislative branch 
on this issue by stating, “[A] court order compelling a minister to bring into 
effect primary legislation would bring the courts right into the very heart of the 
legislative process. But the legislative process is for the legislature not the 
judiciary.” 
 177. See Uriel Rosenthal & Alexander Kouzmin, Crises and Crisis 
Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making, 7 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 277 (1997) (discussing the challenges of crisis 
management). 
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be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to 
maintain its own existence?”178 In times of crisis, the conflict 
between liberty and safety de facto is resolved in favor of the 
latter.179 Therefore, as it is commonly said, the ends usually 
justify the means.180 The priority of the policymakers is to tackle 
the threats for society as a whole while the protection of civil 
liberties is temporarily diminished. At the international level, 
this practice is commonly referred to as derogation.181 
The scope of rights suspended depends on the impending 
emergency. Nonetheless, not every right can be subject to 
suspension. For instance, the European Convention on Human 
Rights provides that no derogation shall be made pertaining to 
the right to life, to the prohibition of torture and slavery, and no 
punishment shall be imposed without law.182 Additionally, as a 
general principle, limits to de-juridification may exist where 
“[t]he infringement is not reversible, or the damage is 
uncountable.”183 
A recent case of de-juridification recorded in the United 
Kingdom is indefinite detention of terrorism suspects.184 A bill 
 
 178. CHESTERFIELD SOCIETY, THE SPEECHES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 325 
(1908) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 179. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (“The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty 
with order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does 
not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the 
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”). See Conway v. Rimmer [1968] 
AC 910 [982] (HL) (stating that “the flame of individual right and justice must 
burn more palely when it is ringed by the more dramatic light of bombed 
building”). 
 180. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: 
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 4 (2007) (“Civil liberties are compromised 
because civil liberties interfere with effective response to the threat . . . .”). 
 181. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]. See 
Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 281 (1976). See also Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights 
Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1981). 
 182. Id. at art. 15(2). 
 183. Antonios E. Kouroutakis, Separation of Powers and the War on Terror; 
An Analysis of the Role of its Institution, 42 BRACTON L.J. 27, 43 (2010). 
 184. Two cases of de-juridification arising from the temporary suspension of 
habeas corpus remedies are recorded in the same year in the United States. See 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that an executive order did 
not have the power to detain Hamdi indefinitely and deprive him of due 
process); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (dismissing the claim on 
procedural grounds because the court lacked jurisdiction). Yet, these cases are 
not appropriate for a comparison because the relevant Act of Congress did not 
have temporal limits. Both petitioners were detained under the Executive Order 
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was presented to the House of Commons on November 12, 2001 
allowing the indefinite detention of foreign nationals implicated 
in international terrorism.185 The initial proposal incorporated a 
fifteen-month sunset clause.186 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and 
Security Act later passed after the sunset period was extended 
to five years on the suggestion of several Members of 
Parliament187 and the Home Affairs Committee.188 
Consequently, Sections 21–23 were to “cease to have effect at the 
end of 10th November 2006.”189 This measure was challenged 
before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords in A v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.190 The Law Lords’ 
decision held that the indefinite detention of foreign suspects of 
terrorism without trial under the Act was incompatible with the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, but remained in effect since British 
judges do not possess judicial review power.191 
In practice, de-juridification means more discretion for the 
political branches of government since law no longer establishes 
standards of protection. Hence, legal protections depend on the 
policy-making choices of the legislator, their discretion in 
balancing competing alternatives, and the protection of 
fundamental rights. 
 
entitled “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism,” which was issued in accordance with an Act of Congress. 
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001); Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). See Amanda L. Tyler, 
The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901 
(2011). 
 185. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Bill 2001-2, H.L. Bill 49. 
 186. Id. at §§ 28(1)–(2)(c) (“(1) Sections 21 to 23 shall, subject to the following 
provisions of this section, expire at the end of the period of 15 months beginning 
with the day on which this Act is passed. (2) The Secretary of State may by order 
(a) repeal sections 21 to 23; (b) revive those sections for a period not exceeding 
one year; (c) provide that those sections shall not expire in accordance with 
subsection (1) or an order under paragraph (b) or this paragraph, but shall 
continue in force for a period not exceeding one year.”). 
 187. 375 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (2001) col. 396. 
 188. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Bill 2001-2, H.C. Bill 351 c. 43. 
 189. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 29(7). 
 190. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (2004) UKHL 56. 
 191. 669 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) col. 161 (“In December 2003, the 
committee under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Newton, 
recommended that Part 4 of the 2001 Act should be repealed and replaced as a 
matter of urgency. But that was not done while there was still time to do it; for 
some reason, the Government waited until they were forced into action by the 
decision of the Law Lords on 16 December . . . .”). 
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It is noteworthy that the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and 
Security Act was reviewed twice based on statutory language192 
following the Secretary of State’s order.193 Lord Lloyd of Berwick 
clearly articulated this conclusion when he remarked that: 
In December 2003, the committee under the 
chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Newton, 
recommended that Part 4 of the 2001 Act should be 
repealed and replaced as a matter of urgency. But that 
was not done while there was still time to do it; for some 
reason, the Government waited until they were forced 
into action by the decision of the Law Lords on 16 
December . . . .194 
The duration of de-juridification is another important 
element in this equation. A priori, the duration of each crisis 
cannot be measured. Policymakers commonly adopt a sunset 
clause and before its expiration, they might renew the legislation 
if the crisis has not fully concluded. However, the promulgation 
of sunset clauses with indefinite duration is incompatible with 
the rationale of emergency legislation and has unintended 
consequences. As mentioned supra,195 the 1995 Court of Appeal 
decision on the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) 
Act of 1939, signals the ease by which emergency legislation can 
become a routine power used by government. 
A member of the House of Commons’ Select Committee on 
Home Affairs has emphasized: 
As we all know, the history of anti-terrorism legislation 
is that when it is introduced, it is represented as 
temporary and as a response to some immediate crisis, 
but it has a habit of becoming permanent. I have 
 
 192. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001, c. 24, § 28. 
 193. Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 (Continuance in Force of 
Sections 21–23) Order 2003, SI 2003/691; Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security 
Act 2001 (Continuance in Force of Sections 21–23) Order 2004, SI 2004/751. 
 194. 670 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) col. 161. 
 195. An example of one of these extensions would be in 1995 when the Court 
of Appeals analyzed the validity of emergency legislation, the Import, Export 
and Customs Powers (Defense) Act of 1939, which was passed during the Second 
World War. Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defense) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 
6 c. 69, § 9(3) (“This act shall continue in force until such date as His Majesty 
may by Order in Council declare to be the date on which the emergency that 
was the occasion of the passing of this Act came to an end . . . .”). 
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therefore tabled—as have others, probably—a sunset 
clause which requires the Government to come back to 
Parliament after five years to go through the entire 
legislative process to obtain the powers that they seek in 
part 4. We picked five years—others may choose a 
shorter or a longer period—because there is a precedent 
for it. 196 
That said, in times of crisis, it seems sunsetting laws mean 
that human rights protections depend primarily on the 
policymaking choices of the executive and on its discretion in 
balancing between specific policies and the protection of rights. 
The ends justify the means and rule of law is consequently 
replaced by the rule of discretion.197 De-juridification removes 
the legal constraints in the exercise of power and policymakers 
have broader room for maneuver and a relatively free hand. 
Such de-juridification, however, is not unlimited since a number 
of human rights guarantees, such as the rights enlisted in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, are not subject to 
modification. 
Even in spite of Ex parte Merryman, de-juridification should 
be subject to judicial review. Courts must have a significant role 
in the protection of rights, even though their role is mainly ex 
post facto and exercised with deference in wartime. In some 
cases though, the judiciary can be a victim of de-juridification. 
D.  JUDICIAL DEACTIVATION 
The question of which branch of the United States 
government has the power to suspend habeas corpus still 
remains unanswered. What is agreed, though, is that temporary 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus deactivates the courts.198 
The sunsetting of particular rights and freedoms has an 
equivalent impact. Courts are the frontrunners in the 
 
 196. 375 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (2001) col. 62–63. 
 197. Dicey has said that, “the rule of law is contrasted with every system of 
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary or 
discretionary powers of constraint.” See DICEY, supra note 138, at 110. 
 198. However, the permanent restriction on alien detainees’ use of habeas 
corpus to access federal courts has been ruled unconstitutional. See Boumediene 
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008). Congress adopted the Military Commissions 
Act in 2006, prohibiting alien detainees or suspected enemy combatants from 
using the writ of habeas corpus to petition federal courts. In Boumediene, the 
Court held the prohibition unconstitutional. 
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juridification of our society—they implement the law, define its 
meaning, determine gaps, fill vacuums, and conduct 
constitutional review.199 Curtailing certain rights under 
sunsetting deactivates courts in the same manner as suspension 
of habeas corpus. 
One of the most famous examples of judicial deactivation 
was when Japanese and Japanese-Americans on the west coast 
were moved to internment camps during the Second World War. 
In an attempt to explain the relatively powerless role of the 
courts, Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent underlined this 
issue: 
Of course, the existence of a military power resting on 
force, so vagrant, so centralized, so necessarily heedless 
of the individual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But I 
would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review 
that seems to me wholly delusive . . . .The chief restraint 
upon those who command the physical forces of the 
country, in the future as in the past, must be their 
responsibility to the political judgments of their 
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.200 
Judicial deactivation has a profound impact on the 
protection of basic guarantees. Since Marbury v. Madison201 in 
1803, many legal orders with separated powers have entrusted 
courts with the task of constitutional review and the protection 
of enumerated rights202—a trend also apparent today in 
Commonwealth nations.203 
 
 199. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). See also 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Josephine Ann Bickel ed., 2d ed. 1986). 
 200. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944). 
 201. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 202. Since World War II, the dominant paradigm of constitutionalism is the 
enhanced role of the courts in constitutional review, especially regarding the 
Bill of Rights. See John E. Ferejohn, Constitutional Review in the Global 
Context, 6 LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49 (2002). A proponent of this model is Ronald 
Dworkin. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). 
However, this model has been criticized by numerous academics. See RICHARD 
BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENSE OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS 
JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007); Michael Mandel, A Brief History of the New 
Constitutionalism, or “How We Changed Everything So That Everything Would 
Remain the Same,” 32 ISR. L. REV. 250 (1998). 
 203. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of 
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This phenomenon was also echoed in a series of U.S. 
Supreme Court cases decided in the aftermath of World War I. 
Congress passed legislation that limited freedom of contract for 
a period of two years, and in certain circumstances allowed a 
tenant to remain in their rental beyond their lease term if they 
continued to pay rent.204 Restriction of a landlord’s eviction 
power was necessitated by the emergencies of war. Justice 
Holmes echoed the passive wartime role of courts in this case, 
stating, “a declaration by a legislature concerning public 
conditions that by necessity and duty it must know, is entitled 
at least to great respect. In this instance Congress stated a 
publicly notorious and almost world-wide fact.”205 
Past experience has shown that courts tend not to intervene 
during emergencies, and in reality defer to the political branches 
of the government for guidance. This is a dangerous proposition 
since the standards of protection in these periods are lower due 
to sunset legislation. In this scenario, it is even more important 
that judicial discretion to intervene is maintained. When 
fundamental protections are sunsetted, the judge therefore 
becomes an ultimum refugium. 
V.   DE-JURIDIFICATION AND SUNSET CLAUSES AT 
TIMES OF CRISIS 
In this Part, we ask what the real problem of de-
juridification in the midst of crisis is: is it the fact that rights are 
suspended or that ‘temporary’ rules are enacted to confer more 
powers to the executive branch. Until now, we have argued that 
de-juridification is not per se unsatisfactory; in fact, it can be 
necessary to guarantee the adoption of timely decisions. 
In the first segment, we unveil the heart of the matter is the 
misuse of sunset clauses to de-juridify our legal order. As we 
have demonstrated in our historical account, some emergency 
measures never seem to sunset after emergency circumstances 
are resolved. In Section A, we delve into the past misuse of 
sunset clauses and explain why de-juridification and sunset 
clauses, as its instrument, have acquired a bad reputation. 
Section B, suggests a normative framework for a more effective 
use of sunset clauses during times of crisis (and beyond). 
 
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001). 
 204. Food Control and District of Columbia Rents Act, Pub. L. No. 66-63, 
§ 101, 41 Stat. 297 (1919). 
 205. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921). 
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A. THE RECENT PAST OF SUNSET CLAUSES AND DE-
JURIDIFICATION 
As mentioned supra, the USA PATRIOT Act was one 
example of many anti-terrorism enactments that utilized sunset 
clauses.206 Sunset provisions contained in the Act were included 
in order to limit the duration of measures constraining certain 
freedoms to a five year period.207 At this time, there was thought 
to be a higher level of terrorist threat. This Act was, however, 
reauthorized in the following years and some of its provisions 
have likely become permanent.208 
Although existing constitutional and criminal law 
structures might be ill-equipped to respond to terrorism,209 
sunset clauses might be an important tool to avoid the 
normalization of emergency powers.210 As demonstrated in our 
historical overview, the suspension of laws, human rights, and 
the deactivation of courts in turbulent times “eats away the 
foundations of republican government.”211 This is particularly 
apropos if emergency powers live beyond the initial tragedy that 
gave rise to the state of emergency. Discretion, efficient decision-
making, and expediency are fundamental elements of de-
juridification since law is not omnipresent. As a result, de-
juridification seems to be the appropriate medicine to combat 
 
 206. In Canada, Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism Act which was 
incorporated into the Criminal Code under ‘Part II.1—Terrorism.’ Anti-
Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41. A sunset clause was included in the bill (Section 
83.32), sunsetting sections 83.28, 83.29 and 83.3 concerning preventative 
arrests and investigative hearing powers, after a five-year period. In Britain, 
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, which amended the Terrorism Act 
2000, introduced the indefinite detention of foreign suspects of terrorism 
without trial and was subject to a 5-year sunset clause. See Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime, and Security Act 2001, c. 24, § 23. 
 207. Examples of the de-juridification include the interception and 
disclosure of communications and surveillance orders. Although section 224 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act contained a four-year sunset clause, a number of its 
sections were later renewed, including the sections regarding sharing of 
criminal information and single-jurisdiction search warrants. USA PATRIOT 
ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001). 
 208. The USA PATRIOT Act was to terminate in 2005, but was reauthorized. 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
 209. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006). 
 210. For a more detailed analysis of the use of sunset clauses to address 
temporary problems including terrorism, see RANCHORDÁS, supra note 14, at 
62–64. 
 211. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 31, at 1801. 
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emergencies. In that respect, sunset clauses have proven to be 
an adequate formula for de-juridification. Sunset clauses are an 
integral element in this process, and what is neglected from the 
criticism is not that sunset clauses fail to expire at the end of the 
emergency, but that once normality is restored, juridification 
and its positive effects fail to reemerge. 
Although used for centuries, sunset clauses do not have a 
good reputation in the legal literature.212 They are thought to be 
ineffective, costly, and unable to impede the “normalization of 
the extraordinary.”213 The repeated extensions of 
counterterrorism legislation, à la the USA PATRIOT Act, is a 
classic example of sunset clauses’ inability to terminate 
emergency legislation. Adopting sunset clauses was an 
important tool in gathering consensus for this bill.214 Sunset 
provisions were supposed to guarantee that limitations on civil 
liberties would not become entrenched, but would rather be 
reevaluated after a determined period. This instrument was 
supposed to allow Congress to revisit this Act and based on new 
information, correct possible policymaking errors by revising or 
repealing unnecessary rules.215 Conversely, these sunset clauses 
produced the opposite effect, facilitating the long-term 
entrenchment that they were originally designed to prevent. 
In this way, sunset clauses have been abused to gather 
consensus regarding controversial, and often emergency, laws 
that would have not been adopted otherwise. The consensus-
gathering virtue attributed to sunset clauses frequently evolves 
into a vice and “sunset clauses have been transformed from an 
instrument of better government into a clever political trap.”216 
Sunset clauses are thus said to be easily employed as “a 
convenient political excuse for shortcutting initial 
parliamentary debate about controversial legislation” and 
delaying essential discussions on the sunset moment.217 
 
 212. For a thorough account of the reasons why sunset clauses have 
developed this ‘bad reputation,’ see RANCHORDÁS, supra note 14. 
 213. Ip, supra note 18, at 87. 
 214. See Sara A. Chandler, Collateral Damage? The Impact of National 
Security Crises on the Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable 
Searches, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 217, 225–26 (2006). 
 215. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1790 (2013). 
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According to the literature, there seems to be “an institutional 
bias in favor of the status quo—agreement is required to change 
a policy, but no agreement is required to sustain it.”218 This is 
often described as a result of so-called ‘legislative inertia’ created 
by the interaction of legislators and interest groups. 
Maintenance of policies, regardless of their effectiveness, can be 
an important way of ensuring the survival of stakeholder 
organizations such as regulatory agencies.219 
This bad reputation is not exclusive to emergency 
legislation, but has also been the result of the deficient 
implementation of sunset clauses in other fields. According to 
Rebecca Kysar, in the field of tax law, sunset clauses were 
employed during the Bush Administration “as apparatuses [to] 
underestimate the revenue costs of legislation or fit the 
legislation within predetermined budget constraints . . . and 
function as rent-extracting mechanisms.”220 By enacting sunset 
clauses instead of permanent tax provisions, lawmakers could 
reduce the estimation of the revenue costs of these laws, since 
the calculation would only take the sunset period into account. 
However, in practice, the original plan was to renew these tax 
cuts later and circumvent budgetary constraints under the cover 
of a temporary provision.221 
Finally, the non-selective use of sunset clauses in the 1970s 
and 80s can explain their bad reputation. The ‘sunset boom’ at 
the state level was motivated by the desire to limit the growing 
power of executive agencies, rather than by the economic crisis 
in the 1970s. An excessive number of sunset clauses resulted, for 
example, in deficient evaluations and incorrect evaluation 
periods. According to Kearney’s 1990 study, most sunset clauses 
were typified by incorrect sunset review periods.222 Excessively 
short periods burdened sunset commissions with constant 
reviews, which meant that several automatic reauthorizations 
took place. The retrospective evaluation of sunset clauses 
became, in many cases, a mere formality that did not impede 
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agencies from continuing ineffective and unnecessary programs. 
These pathologies continue to affect the reputation of sunset 
clauses today and diminish hope for a brighter future for de-
juridification. 
B.  NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Juridification can also be stigmatized because it represents 
a reality where jus is the predominant element of society.223 
However, history has shown that the reality of limitless de-
juridification at times of crisis can be uglier. Sunset clauses have 
walked side-by-side with de-juridification to guarantee the 
temporary limitation of fundamental rights and enhanced 
legislative oversight. However, these legislative instruments 
have not always fulfilled their mission. Temporary de-
juridification requires a normative framework that can set 
boundaries for the spaces susceptible of juridification. 
Firstly, an important step would be to clearly define the 
situations that can and should be de-juridified on a temporary 
basis. An inflexible definition of a state of emergency and the 
reasons that justify the temporary measures must be provided. 
This would minimize the possibility that emergency powers 
remain valid after the emergency has ceased to exist. A 
statement of reasons would invite the legislature to reflect upon 
both the need for emergency de-juridification and its duration.224 
In addition, before emergency de-juridification, legislatures 
should investigate whether a certain situation is the result of 
serious dangers or merely risks. Luhman’s distinction between 
risk and danger exemplifies this issue: risk “refers to the 
potential future loss as a consequence of a decision . . . and we 
can speak of risk only if we can identify a decision without which 
the loss could not have occurred,” whereas danger refers to “the 
potential loss resulting from something external to the one 
affected.”225 Terrorism and natural disasters can be qualified as 
dangers because they are unexpected, whereas some economic 
policies (e.g., investment in risky securities or financial 
speculation) will easily fall into the category of risks. This 
distinction is nonetheless fluid and a risk for one person could 
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be a danger for others; Christian Borch explains, “heavily geared 
investment in the financial markets [risk] might trigger a 
financial collapse which has negative effects on people who did 
not speculate [danger].”226 In such a scenario, de-juridification 
might be justified to tackle the results of a danger which was 
unexpected to most citizens. 
In the case of risks, legislators might decide to adopt sunset 
clauses in order to gather more information related to a certain 
phenomenon. Kysar, despite her critical position toward 
temporary legislation, acknowledges that sunset clauses have 
been used in the United States as an instrument to assess the 
risks and effects of a new policy, as well as to obtain more 
information about it during the interim period between 
enactment and sunset.227 In such cases, sunset clauses may be 
employed to experiment with a new act, rather than to de-
juridify. 
A natural question is whether there are sectors that should 
never be de-juridified, even on a temporary basis. As mentioned 
supra, this may be so in prohibiting torture or in relation to a 
number of core legal institutions like legislative non-delegation, 
which are essential for the functioning of any state and 
society.228 This is exemplified by the German ‘eternity clause’ 
and unamendable provisions of its Basic Law,229 as interpreted 
by the Federal Constitutional Court. In 1976, this court affirmed 
that “laws that are indispensable for the legal capacity and 
[normal] functioning of a state”230 and the laws that are required 
for the concretization of fundamental rights guarantees (e.g., 
media and broadcasting laws) are not compatible with a 
temporary or transitory nature. 
After having decided whether a social space can be de-
juridified, policymakers should reflect upon the duration of the 
sunset clause. This period should coincide with the emergency, 
lasting long enough to allow the executive to effectively manage 
an issue and gather information as to its nature, but should not 
be disproportionate. Another important element of temporary 
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de-juridification is retrospective evaluation by the legislature, 
and courts if necessary (or ex post evaluation). 
As mentioned before, the adoption of a sunset provision 
increases the probability that political opponents will support 
new laws due to the promise of future revision.231 Evaluations 
should therefore be an essential element of de-juridification. The 
necessity of extraordinary measures should be reassessed after 
a certain period, preferably by an independent evaluation 
commission, and the transparency of this evaluation should be 
guaranteed, when possible, by the publication. In some cases 
though, the publication of information may be contrary to 
national security interests. Nevertheless, reconsidering the 
necessity of a certain regulation can ensure that the executive 
takes new information into account, reassesses the underlying 
regulatory problem, and evaluates the effects of the rules at 
stake.232 
Any evaluation should be used to assess the effects of the 
sunset disposition and verify whether objectives have been 
achieved. Depending on the evaluation report, an informed 
decision can then be made as to whether to let the provision 
sunset or renew. The secret to the successful adoption of sunset 
clauses and the consequent de-juridification at times of crisis 
seems to be highly dependent on the commitment of the 
executive branch to conduct meaningful sunset reviews and 
provide legislators with accurate and complete information.233 
This implies that legislators must also ensure that the 
evaluation techniques and criteria provided in legislation are 
adequate to the programs that will later be evaluated.234 
V.   CONCLUSION 
Juridification has a negative connotation. It symbolizes the 
excessive role of jus in societal relationships, invading every 
facet of our life, imposing norms, and regulating processes. 
Conversely, crises demand fast and effective decisions instead of 
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burdensome procedures. In this Article, we argued that de-
juridification is necessary at critical times and can be executed 
through a broader use of sunset clauses. Emergencies require 
less bureaucracy transfer of decision-making power from the 
legislature to bodies with expertise, and broad consensus in 
decision-making. Sunset clauses may be a useful mechanism to 
achieve these goals. However, sunset clauses are just one of 
many instruments of de-juridification. This is the basis for the 
key question of why sunset clauses often fail to have meaningful 
effect and why de-juridification may be preferable to 
juridification. 
The annals of history have repeatedly shown that the 
rhetoric of emergency and de-juridification at times of crises can 
be dangerous. For example, many oppressive regimes found 
their genesis with the establishment of emergency powers that 
became normalized.235 As a result, this Article analyzed the 
historical use of temporary legislation to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus and facilitate the adoption of controversial 
measures such as indefinite detention in the context of terrorism 
and the USA PATRIOT Act. Too frequently, temporary 
suspensions of constitutional rights became excessive, and 
emergency legislation lived beyond the emergency it was meant 
to tackle. 
De-juridification is, however, not solely a source of 
challenges. The aim of this Article was rather to explain why de-
juridification can sometimes be desirable, and how history has 
taught us to use the weapons of de-juridification, such as sunset 
clauses, in a nuanced manner. Sunset clauses promise to erase 
legislative provisions that might be unnecessary after times of 
crisis, and ‘rewind’ legislation to the original status quo after the 
end of this critical period. This may be a dangerous promise, 
however, that comes at the price of basic guarantees and the 
principle of separation of powers. It is nonetheless possible to 
bring the best out of temporary de-juridification by enacting 
sunset clauses within a normative framework that cogently 
distinguishes between risks and dangers, ‘sunsettable’ and ‘non-
sunsettable’ subject areas, and adequate sunset periods, placing 
a strong emphasis on evaluation. 
Although the de-juridification of social spheres and rights 
might seem at first sight an attractive alternative to excessive 
legalization and regulation of lawmaking procedures, fewer rules 
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might also result in the reduction of key civil liberties and our 
system of checks and balances. Less is not always more, unless 
it is not meant to last. 
 
